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NOTES
IS COMPULSORY COURT-ANNEXED MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE ARBITRATION
CONSTITUTIONAL? HOW THE DEBATE
REFLECTS A TREND TOWARDS COMPULSION IN
ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION
Matthew Parrott*
INTRODUCTION

Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR)1 is a classification of methods
used to efficiently, cost-effectively, and equitably resolve disputes 2 without
resorting to litigation. 3 "ADR is premised upon the intention that by
providing disputing parties with a process that is confidential, voluntary,
adaptable to the needs and interests of the parties, and within party control,
a more satisfying, durable, and efficient resolution of disputes may be

* J.D. Candidate, 2008, Fordham University School of Law; B.A., 2003, Lafayette College.
Thank you to Professor Jacqueline Nolan-Haley, my family, friends, and the Fordham Law
Review Editors and Staff for your support and insights.
1. Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) encompasses a variety of processes disputing
parties may use to resolve their conflicts instead of resorting to litigation. See Jacqueline M.
Nolan-Haley, Alternative Dispute Resolution 1-2 (2001). ADR usually involves the
assistance of a third-party neutral. Examples of such processes are arbitration, mediation,
early neutral case evaluation, mini-trial, summary jury trial, and private judging. See
Katherine V. W. Stone, Private Justice: The Law of Alternative Dispute Resolution 5-8
(2000) (describing different ADR processes); Maureen A. Weston, Checks on Participant
Conduct in Compulsory ADR: Reconciling the Tension in the Need for Good-Faith
Participation,Autonomy, and Confidentiality, 76 Ind. L.J. 591, 592 n.1 (2001) (noting the
origins of ADR and its various forms).
2. See Monica L. Warmbrod, Could an Attorney Face DisciplinaryActions or Even
Legal MalpracticeLiabilityfor Failure to Inform Clients ofAlternative Dispute Resolution?,
27 Cumb. L. Rev. 791, 794 (1997).
3. See Kenneth Gumbiner, An Overview of Alternative Dispute Resolution, in
Alternative Dispute Resolution: The Litigator's Handbook 1, 1 (Nancy F. Atlas et al. eds.,
2000) ("The concept of alternative dispute resolution... is, in a sense, nothing more than the
nomenclature for the various creative ways that have been used to resolve disputes short of
[the] 'last resort' [of litigation]."). Although litigation is an integral part of the U.S. civil
justice system, "[m]any critics have claimed there is a crisis in the ... system, . . . caused by
the excessive delay, expense, inflexibility, and technicality of the courts." Stone, supra note
1, at 2. Legal reformers have embraced ADR as a way to avoid these pitfalls inherent in the
traditional civil justice system. Id.
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achieved."'4 The principles of voluntariness and party control over process
are traditionally considered essential to effective ADR. 5 The ADR
movement 6 has been extremely successful in promoting ADR;7 the federal
and state governments now embrace ADR, 8 and ADR has become a
permanent fixture in the United States' legal framework. 9

4. Weston, supra note 1, at 592.
5. See Lucy V. Katz, Compulsory Alternative Dispute Resolution and Voluntarism:
Two-Headed Monster or Two Sides of the Coin?, 1993 J. Disp. Resol. 1, 1 (noting that the
principle of voluntariness, traditionally a core tenet of ADR, has been "eroded").
6. The notion of an "ADR movement" reflects the efforts of scholars, attorneys, and
lawmakers who promote widespread use of ADR in various legal contexts.
Judge Harry T. Edwards explains,
The Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) movement has seen an
extraordinary transformation in the last ten years. Little more than a decade ago,
only a handful of scholars and attorneys perceived the need for alternatives to
litigation. The ADR idea was seen as nothing more than a hobbyhorse for a few
offbeat scholars. Today, with the rise of public complaints about the inefficiencies
and injustices of our traditional court systems, the ADR movement has attracted a
bandwagon following of adherents. ADR is no longer shackled with the reputation
of a cult movement.
Harry T. Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema?, 99 Harv. L.
Rev. 668, 668 (1986).
7. Despite the ADR movement's success, some scholars have been critical of ADR.
See generally id.; Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 Yale L.J. 1073 (1984); Kevin C.
McMunigal, The Costs of Settlement: The Impact of Scarcity of Adjudication on Litigating
Lawyers, 37 UCLA L. Rev. 833 (1990); Richard C. Reuben, PublicJustice: Toward a State
Action Theory of Alternative Dispute Resolution, 85 Cal. L. Rev. 577 (1997); Jean R.
Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme Court's Preferencefor
BindingArbitration, 74 Wash. U. L.Q. 637 (1996).
8. The federal and state governments support ADR because it allows parties to resolve
conflicts before they become ripe for litigation, which frees up traditional adjudicatory
resources. For example, in the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998, Congress
promoted the use of ADR to facilitate settlements and increase adjudicative efficiency. See
28 U.S.C. § 651 (2000); see also Developments in the Law---ADR, the Judiciary, and
Justice: Coming to Terms with the Alternatives, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 1851, 1861-62 (2000)
[hereinafter Developments] (describing the impact of the Alternative Dispute Resolution
Act). Arbitration is especially encouraged by the U.S. Supreme Court as a viable alternative
to litigation. See generally Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985);
Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984); Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury
Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983). Institutions and private parties, on the other hand, like
ADR because it affords flexibility, privacy, and speedy resolution of disputes, as opposed to
the lengthy and expensive process of litigation. See Edward J. Costello, Jr., Whether and
When to Use Alternative Dispute Resolution, in Alternative Dispute Resolution: The
Litigator's Handbook, supra note 3, at 15, 22-23.
9. See Judith Resnik, Many Doors? Closing Doors? Alternative Dispute Resolution
and Adjudication, 10 Ohio St. J. on Disp. Resol. 211, 239-40 (1995) ("Via legislation,
national and local rule making, and executive proclamation, every branch of the federal
government has signalled its support of ADR.").
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Nevertheless, ADR is a relatively recent phenomenon,' 0 and its use in the
U.S. civil justice system is still evolving. I1 The ADR movement has gone
through a number of phases-from initially presenting arbitration as a
viable supplement to litigation 12 to, more recently, encouraging greater use
of processes like mediation and principled negotiation 13 in various legal
contexts. 14 As the ADR movement developed, a trend of sacrificing the
core principles of voluntariness and party control over process emerged. 5
Two examples are illustrative of this trend: when judges misinterpret ADR
contractual provisions, thereby sacrificing parties' ability to craft their own
ADR processes for judicially mandated ADR; 16 and when parties are
essentially forced to use ADR when presented with adhesion contracts
containing ADR clauses. 17 These occurrences reflect how compulsion has
become accepted within the ADR movement, a trend that heralded a new
phase of the movement altogether: compulsory ADR in federal courts-a
process whereby litigants with no prior contractual relationship are forced
8
into court-annexed ADR.'
Concurrent with the ADR movement's initial period of evolution, during
the mid- to late twentieth century, the United States experienced a
proliferation of medical malpractice ("med-mal") lawsuits.19 The cause of
the spike in med-mal suits during this period is unclear. 20 Nevertheless, the
10. The 1976 National Conference on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the
Administration of Justice, convened by Chief Justice Warren Burger, is often considered to
have spawned the modem ADR movement. See Stone, supra note 1, at 3-4; see also infra
note 68 and accompanying text. However, arbitration, a type of ADR by which parties
submit their "dispute to a third party who renders a decision after hearing arguments and
reviewing evidence," has existed for hundreds of years. Stone, supra note 1, at 5-6; see also
infra Part I.A. 1.
11. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow Introduction: What Will We Do When Adjudication
Ends? A Brief Intellectual History of ADR, 44 UCLA L. Rev. 1613, 1617 (1997) ("It is
becoming harder and harder to keep definitional integrity between processes as the parties'
needs and court requirements have altered our original understandings."); see also
Developments, supra note 8, at 1857 (noting the widespread use of ADR in various
industries and that "ADR mechanisms continue to evolve").
12. See infra Part I.A.1 (describing how courts and lawmakers ultimately embraced
arbitration in the 1920s).
13. See, e.g., Roger Fisher et al., Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without
Giving In (2d ed. 1991).
14. Several industries, such as in the consumer and labor contracting contexts, have
adapted ADR to address reoccurring legal disputes. See Stone, supra note 1, at 303;
Developments, supra note 8, at 1855-57 (describing the use of ADR across industries). See
generally Altemative Dispute Resolution:
The Litigator's Handbook, supra note 3
(compiling articles discussing the use of ADR in the consumer, commercial, employment,
labor, and other contexts).
15. See infra Part I.A.2.
16. See infra Part t.A.2.a.
17. See infra Part I.A.2.b.
18. See infra Part I.A.3.
19. See infra Part I.B. See generally James C. Mohr, American Medical Malpractice
Litigation in HistoricalPerspective,283 JAMA 1731 (2000).
20. See Edward A. Dauer & David W. Becker, Jr., Conflict Management in Managed
Care, in Health Care Dispute Resolution Manual: Techniques for Avoiding Litigation 1:1,
1:25 (2000) ("[I]t remains an open question whether the insurance crises.., were
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effects were dramatic. Insurance premiums skyrocketed, forcing many
physicians to abandon the practice of medicine altogether. 2 1 Physicians
needed a way to stop the influx of lawsuits and the rising costs of practicing
22
medicine, and the modem health care tort reform movement was born.
Interestingly, "[d]uring the liability insurance crises . . . tort reformers
seized on ADR as a way to divert cases away from the courts. The ADR
community, eager for an opportunity to advance [its] cause, joined
league." 23 In light of the ADR movement's experimentation with
compulsory processes around the same time, the stage was set for state
lawmakers to devise tort reform strategies employing compulsory ADR.
In fact, the merger of the ADR and tort reform movements produced a
new form of ADR altogether:
compulsory court-annexed med-mal
arbitration. 24 Seeking to control the flood of lawsuits, by the early 1970s
nearly thirty states 25 had passed some form of a compulsory court-annexed
med-mal arbitration law. 2 6 The process is modeled on private arbitration
but operates under the authority of the state; a med-mal lawsuit is diverted
to a court-annexed panel before proceeding in court. 27 The panel,
consisting of attorneys, current or former judges, and oftentimes a
physician, reviews the med-mal claim and decides issues of liability, and
sometimes even damages. 28 The panel's decision is nonbinding, so the
disputants are ultimately permitted to have a trial on the merits of the med-

attributable to increases in legal liability, or to cyclic factors endogenous to the liability
insurance industry."); Michelle M. Mello et al., The New Medical Malpractice Crisis, 348
New Eng. J. Med. 2281, 2282-83 (2003) ("What has brought these troubling times to
American medicine? The drivers of the crisis are a subject of intense political controversy,
and the quantity and the quality of evidence on the issue are thin."); see also Kyle Miller,
Note, Putting the Caps on Caps: Reconciling the Goal of Medical MalpracticeReform with
the Twin Objectives of Tort Law, 59 Vand. L. Rev. 1457, 1469 (2006) (identifying a debate
among physicians, insurers, and plaintiffs' attorneys over the cause of the medical
malpractice ("med-mal") insurance crises and concluding that "[n]o one, not the [American
Medical Association (AMA)], the American Trial Lawyers Association, the Insurance
Information Institute, or the Governmental Accounting Office, has precisely determined
what causes medical malpractice insurance crises").
21. See infra Part I.B.2.
22. See infra Part I.B.3.
23. Edward A. Dauer, Alternatives to Litigationfor Health Care Conflicts and Claims:
Alternative Dispute Resolution in Medicine, 16 Hematology Oncology Clinics N. Am. 1415,
1428 (2002).
24. This procedure is also commonly referred to as a screening panel or mandatory
arbitration. See infra Part I.B.3. See generally Dauer, supra note 23.
25. See Edward F. Seavers, Note, Medical Malpractice Mediation Panels: A
ConstitutionalAnalysis, 46 Fordham L. Rev. 322, 350-53 (1977) (describing twenty-eight
states' compulsory med-mal ADR statutes in appendices I-IV).
26. See infra Part I.B.3 (discussing the development of compulsory court annexed medmal arbitration).
27. See infra Part I.B.3.
28. See Seavers, supra note 25, at 325 n.18 ("Most arbitration panels are composed of
professional arbitrators, usually attorneys. On the other hand, every screening panel includes
at least one member of the medical profession." (citation omitted)).
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mal lawsuit. 29 However, state laws differ over whether the record
and
30
decision generated by the panel is admissible during the trial phase.
The constitutionality of compulsory court-annexed med-mal arbitration is
unclear. 3 1 Rights to jury trial, equal protection, and due process challenges
are most commonly raised. 32
Some states' laws have withstood
constitutional scrutiny, while other states' laws have been struck down as
unconstitutional. 33 Procedural differences among the different laws, as well
as different state constitutional standards, make it difficult to generate a
black-letter rule regarding the constitutionality of compulsory courtannexed med-mal arbitration. Nevertheless, every compulsory court34
annexed med-mal arbitration law raises basic constitutional concerns.
This Note examines the development of compulsory court-annexed medmal arbitration and its constitutional implications. 3 5 Part I traces the
evolution of the ADR and tort reform movements and examines how their
merger produced compulsory court-annexed med-mal arbitration laws in
many states. Particular attention is paid to recent trends in the ADR
movement, reflecting the fact that compulsion has become intertwined with
ADR. Part I also examines how the U.S. tort reform movement ultimately
utilized compulsory ADR for its own purposes. Finally, Part I surveys
current compulsory court-annexed med-mal arbitration laws and classifies
them according to whether they allow admission of the arbitration result at
trial.
Part II examines the constitutionality of compulsory court-annexed medmal arbitration and describes how state laws have fared in federal and state
29. Parties must be afforded the opportunity to have a med-mal lawsuit decided by a
court, pursuant to the constitutional right to a jury trial. See infra note 302. Interestingly,
compulsory court-annexed med-mal arbitration has, in some states, been held to violate right
to jury trial guarantees, even though ajury trial is ultimately afforded. See infra Part II.B.2.
30. See infra Part I.C (describing the distinction between the admissible and
inadmissible approaches compulsory court-annexed med-mal arbitration laws follow).
31. See infra Part II. Additionally, critics complain that compulsory court-annexed medmal arbitration distorts fundamental ADR principles. See infra notes 223-24 and
accompanying text.
32. Other constitutional challenges to state laws mandating ADR for med-mal disputes
are separation of powers concerns and principles of federalism, see generally Dwight
Golann, Making Alternative Dispute Resolution Mandatory: The ConstitutionalIssues, 68
Or. L. Rev. 487 (1989), and perhaps even First Amendment challenges, see Katz, supra note
5, at 22. However, these constitutional issues are infrequent in challenges to compulsory
court-annexed med-mal arbitration laws.
33. See infra Part II.
34. See infra Part II.
35. During the 1970s, 1980s, and even into the 1990s, when states first passed
compulsory court-annexed med-mal arbitration laws, scholars debated the constitutional
implications of compulsory ADR. See, e.g., Martin H. Redish, Legislative Response to the
Medical Malpractice Insurance Crisis: Constitutional Implications, 55 Tex. L. Rev. 759
(1977); Matthew Zimmerman, Comment, The Constitutionality of Medical Malpractice
Mediation Panels: A Maryland Perspective, 9 U. Bait. L. Rev. 75 (1979); see also Golann,
supra note 32; Katz, supra note 5. This Note assesses recent developments in the tort reform
and ADR movements, paying particular attention to lessons learned from new trends in the
ADR movement relating to compulsory ADR.
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courts. Finally, Part III argues that compulsory court-annexed med-mal
arbitration laws should be struck down or repealed, because they pose
unnecessary constitutional risks and distort fundamental principles of ADR.
I. Two MOVEMENTS COMING TOGETHER: ADR AND TORT REFORM
A. ADR in the United States: An Evolving Movement

ADR was not always accepted as a viable dispute resolution mechanism
in the United States. Only since the late twentieth century has ADR
become a fixture of the U.S. legal landscape. 36 Although the ADR
movement has been judged to be a success, 37 the notion of exactly what
38
ADR encompasses is still evolving.
Part I.A. 1 examines the roots of the modem ADR movement, paying
particular attention to the movement's core principles of voluntariness,
party control over process, and delivery of justice. 39 Next, Part I.A.2
examines recent trends in the ADR movement, focusing on judicial
misapplications of ADR agreements and ADR in adhesion contracts.
Finally, Part I.A.3 explores the new direction the ADR movement has taken
towards a system of compulsory ADR.
1. The ADR Movement: Achieving a Uniform Application of ADR Laws
While ADR, thought of as the umbrella classification for several types of
dispute resolution methods, 40 is a relatively new legal phenomenon,
arbitration has a rich history. 4 1

Arbitration is a unique form of ADR.

36. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
37. See supra note 6.
38. See supra note 11.
39. See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text. As one scholar commented,
[T]here is a view of ADR in which it is not merely an alternative forum, a more
efficient version of the civil justice system. Some commentators claim that the
alternative processes differ from courts not only in terms of the procedures
followed, but also in terms of the substantive norms to be applied. It is claimed
that alternative dispute resolution involves, and should involve, the application of
different rules and different norms than a court would apply in the resolution of a
dispute.... For this reason, some commentators advocate ADR not only as
cheaper justice or expedited justice, but as better justice.
Stone, supra note 1, at 19; see also Golann, supra note 32, at 490 ("[A] major theme of ADR
is to provide a better quality of dispute resolution. Economical ADR processes are attractive
to judges and legislators concerned about the quality of conventional justice.").
40. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
41. In fact, it has been suggested that Aristotle extolled the value of arbitration. John D.
Feerick has noted, "Had Athens and Sparta abided by the dispute resolutions provisions of
their treaties, the Peloponnesian War may never have been ignited and, later, Athens
vanquished." John D. Feerick, Professor and former Dean, Fordham University School of
Law, Federal Arbitration Act at 80: A Tribute Anniversary Lecture Series, Keynote Address
at the American Arbitration Association Conference: Why a Federal Arbitration Act?
Modern Arbitration at its Core 5-6 (Oct. 25, 2004) (on file with the Fordham Law Review)
(citing L. B. Sohn, InternationalArbitration in HistoricalPerspective: Past and Present,in
International Arbitration: Past and Prospects 9, 9 (A.H.A. Soons ed., 1990)).
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Unlike negotiation and mediation, which are meant to facilitate valuemaximizing settlements, arbitration requires parties to submit to the will of
42
their arbitrator or panel, which usually issues a binding decision.
43
Arbitration and mediation are the most used ADR processes, and their
core principles, voluntariness
and party control over process, are common
44
among all forms of ADR.
Since medieval times in England, merchants and private parties have
sought ways to resolve disputes quickly and cheaply. 4 5 Arbitration was
practiced in the United States during colonial times, 46 especially within
local communities, religious groups, and voluntary associations. 47 For
example, during the seventeenth century, the colonies of Connecticut and
New York adopted policies requiring that some disputes be settled using
arbitration. 48 Even George Washington appears to have served as an
arbitrator and mediator for local disputes in Virginia, and he prescribed
arbitration procedures for settling conflicts arising from his will. 49 In the
early eighteenth century, immigrants and businessmen used negotiation and
mediation as a method for seeking private justice and affirming community
' ' 50
values like "mutual access [to decision makers], responsibility, and trust.
Unfortunately, however, the practice of ADR was generally unregulated
for the first 150 years in the United States, and common law judges 5 1 often

42. See Louise A. LaMothe, Choosing Who and What, in Alternative Dispute
Resolution: The Litigator's Handbook, supra note 3, at 59, 59.
43. See Developments, supra note 8, at 1858 ("Mediation and arbitration remain the
most widespread forms of ADR, but practitioners continue to develop additional problemsolving means of resolving disputes.").
44. See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text.
45. See Reuben, supra note 7, at 599 (explaining that merchants' arbitration agreements
were typically enforced by medieval English courts during "arbitration's formative years").
But see Feerick, supra note 41, at 6 (suggesting that seventeenth century English courts
usually enforced arbitration awards but did "little to enforce agreements to arbitrate future
disputes" and that "the English history of arbitration is somewhat unclear"). For a historical
account of mechanisms used for resolving civil disputes in the United States, see Jerold S.
Auerbach, Justice Without Law? (1983).
46. See Reuben, supra note 7, at 600 ("The history of ADR in the United States involved
both arbitration and mediation, and tracked the English evolution in many ways. Both
techniques were commonly used in the colonial period.").
47. See Stone, supra note 1, at 10-11 (citing Auerbach, supra note 45).
48. See Feerick, supra note 41, at 8 (citing Fred I. Kent, Pioneers in American
Arbitration: A Symposium on Commercial, Industrial and InternationalArbitration, 27
N.Y.U. L.Q. Rev. 501 (1940)). Thus, it seems, the specter of compulsory ADR has existed
since the early days of arbitration in the U.S. civil justice system.
49. See Feerick, supra note 41, at 8 (citing George Washington, Last Will and
Testament, in 37 The Writings of George Washington 275, 294 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed.,
1940)).
50. See Stone, supra note 1, at 11 (citing Auerbach, supra note 45).
51. Until the early twentieth century in the United States, common law judges often
refused to order performance of arbitration agreements and awarded only nominal amounts
for breaches of promises to arbitrate. See Stone, supra note 1,at 305. Once parties actually
submitted to arbitration, however, most judges would convert arbitration awards rendered by
arbitration panels into court judgments. Id.
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rejected arbitration agreements 52 that usurped traditional courts'
jurisdiction. 53 For example, Judge Benjamin Cardozo proclaimed in a 1914
opinion that "[t]he jurisdiction of our courts is established by law, and is not
to be diminished, any more than it is to be increased, by the convention of
the parties." 54 The U.S. Supreme Court considered "agreements in advance
to oust the courts of the jurisdiction conferred by law [to be] illegal and
55
void."
Federal and state governments took notice of arbitration largely in
reaction to this type of judicial hostility. 56 Many lawmakers thought
participants in interstate commerce should be free, and indeed encouraged,
to resolve their disputes privately. 57 Furthermore, several Congressmen
argued that "clogging of [the] courts [was] such that the delays amount to a
virtual denial of justice." 58 Arbitration was seen as a viable alternative to
litigation; it required low expenditures of judicial resources while ensuring
more social justice than the courts were then able to provide.
59
Thus, in 1925, Congress passed the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).
The FAA makes arbitration agreements in contracts involving interstate
commerce enforceable in federal courts. 60 The FAA effectively allows
parties' contractual agreements to preempt state laws, many of which
proscribe nontraditional adjudication, and "validate almost anything that the
private parties put into their agreement."'6 1 The Supreme Court has held

52. The practice of arbitration and the notion that disputes could be resolved without
judicial involvement catalyzed the ADR movement. Thus, to say that "ADR was
unregulated" takes for granted the fact that new processes have been developed and
subsumed within the concept of ADR during the movement's development.
53. See Feerick, supra note 41, at 8 ("[Flollowing the adoption of the Constitution, the
common law's disfavor of arbitration provisions expressed itself throughout the United
States.").
54. Meacham v. Jamestown, Franklin & Clearfield R.R. Co., 105 N.E. 653, 656 (N.Y.
1914) (Cardozo, J., concurring).
55. Insurance Co. v. Morse, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 445,451 (1874).
56. New York, in 1920, was one of the first states to pass a statute condoning private
arbitration agreements. See Ian R. MacNeil, American Arbitration Law: Reformation,
Nationalization, Internationalization 34-37 (1992). This was one of the primary impetuses
behind the attention Congress paid to the enforcement of arbitration agreements. See
generally id. at 47, 83-122.
57. See Feerick, supra note 41, at 13 (noting that Senate records reflect a prevailing view
in Congress that "the settlement of disputes by arbitration appeals to big business and little
business alike, to corporate interest as well as to individuals .... [T]he record.

..

shows not

only the great value of voluntary arbitrations, but the practical justice in the enforced
arbitration of disputes where written agreements for that purpose have been voluntarily and
solemnly entered into" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
58. See Feerick, supra note 41, at 10 (internal quotation marks omitted).
59. Pub. L. No. 68-401, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified as amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16
(2000)).
60. See Stone, supra note 1, at 312-15.
61. Dauer & Becker, supra note 20, at 1:57; see also Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman
Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52 (1995); Volt Info. Sciences, Inc. v. Bd. of Trustees, 489 U.S. 468
(1989). Interestingly, "[m]uch of health care does indeed involve interstate commerce ...
[because] [t]he federal government itself funds a good deal of it," so arbitration clauses in
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that the FAA preempts state laws limiting the effectiveness of ADR
agreements 62 and that the Act should be read
broadly when deciding
63
whether a contract involves interstate commerce.
The FAA made arbitration a viable dispute resolution mechanism during
the turbulent periods of the mid- and late twentieth century and helped raise
social consciousness about ADR.64 For example, in the 1960s, arbitration
and mediation were used as problem-solving tools for disputes arising out
of "the civil rights struggles and the Vietnam War" which led to
"considerable strife and conflict. '6 5 As former Dean of Fordham Law
School John D. Feerick explains,
[T]he century that unfolded after 1925 involved military conflicts on a
world stage, a Great Depression, technological and scientific
developments of unfathomable proportions, and exponential growth in the
law and its reach to practically every aspect of human existence. As
citizens, by the millions, turned more and more to the courts for relief, the
need for other means of resolving disputes became an imperative, leading
66
to the [modem] alternative dispute resolution movement ....
Thus, the modem ADR movement signified more than a critique of the
traditional U.S. civil justice system: ADR represented a new means of
67
securing justice in a turbulent sociopolitical society.
The modem ADR movement flourished in the 1970s, when Chief Justice
Warren Burger called for greater use of ADR to replace litigation that had
become inefficient, overly expensive, and too technical for the average
citizen. 68 The 1980s and 1990s saw an explosion of ADR. 69 This
explosion coincided with Supreme Court decisions reaffirming ADR as a

health care agreements are almost always enforceable. Dauer & Becker, supra note 20, at
1:57.
62. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984); see also Golann, supra note 32,
at 558 (discussing federal preemption of state laws governing ADR processes).
63. See Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995).
64. Additionally, the American Arbitration Association (AAA), which was formed in
1926, only a year after the FAA was adopted, provides institutional ADR services for the
business community. See MacNeil, supra note 56, at 41; see also American Arbitration
Association, Public Service at the American Arbitration Association 2 (2004) (on file with
the Fordham Law Review) (outlining the successful history of the Federal Arbitration Acti
(FAA) and noting that "[i]n post-World War I America, as public courts were flooded with
cases, the business community became increasingly interested in private arbitration
tribunals").
65. Frank E. A. Sander, Alternative Methods of Dispute Resolution: An Overview, 37 U.
Fla. L. Rev. 1, 2 (1985).
66. See Feerick, supra note 41, at 4.
67. See generally id.
68. Many scholars consider the 1976 National Conference on the Causes of Popular
Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, or the Pound Conference, as the event that
initiated the modem ADR movement. See Stone, supra note 1, at 3-4.
69. In the case of just one institutional provider of ADR services, the American
Arbitration Association, there were over 1,170,000 arbitration cases filed from 1990 to 2001,
and by 2000, 872 new cases were being filed on average every working day. See Feerick,
supra note 41, at 4-5.
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viable and necessary alternative to litigation. 70 "The Supreme Court's
broad judicial support of ADR has continued into the 1990s-as the Court
has cast aside generalized concerns over power imbalances and...
expanded the reach of the FAA by giving the
term 'commerce,' as used in
71
the Act, its broadest possible construction."
Mediation, another integral component of the ADR movement, became
part of the national consciousness with the adoption of the Uniform
Mediation Act by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws. 72 In 1990, Congress enacted the Administrative Dispute
Resolution Act, 73 "which requires federal agencies to consider ADR in
settling disputes. As a result, numerous federal and state agencies now
utilize ADR procedures to handle their caseloads." 74 ADR mandates have
also become common in other federal statues, 7 5 such as the Civil Justice
76
Reform Act of 1990 (CJRA).
Ironically, the federal government's broad support of ADR, one of the
original aims of the ADR movement, has altered the notion of what ADR is.
The federal government's impact has been so significant, some argue, that
the movement's original focus, providing just and equitable conflict
resolution in a turbulent society with overburdened courts, has been
distorted. 77 As one scholar suggests,
Twenty years ago, the ADR movement was overwhelmingly focused

on developing alternatives to the costs of litigation. Since then, we have
discovered that reducing litigation cost and delay are only some of the
benefits of ADR. Today, we possess a knowledge that contributes to the

70. See Rueben, supra note 7, at 602-03 (describing the impact of Mitsubishi Motors
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985), and the Court's willingness to
enforce arbitration clauses in contracts).
71. See id. (footnotes omitted).
72. Unif. Mediation Act (amended 2003), 7A U.L.A. 91 (2006).
73. Pub. L. No. 101-552, 104 Stat. 2736 (1990) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§
571-84 (2000)); see also Katz, supra note 5, at 18 ("Every federal agency must 'adopt a
policy that addresses the use of alternative means of dispute resolution and case
management' and 'examine alternative means of resolving disputes in connection with
adjudication, rulemaking, enforcement, issuing of licenses or permits, contract
administration, litigation involving the agency, and "other agency matters.["]"' (quoting
Administrative Dispute Resolution Act § 3).
74. Stone, supra note 1, at 5.
75. See Katz, supra note 5, at 19 (describing how ADR has been incorporated into the
Americans with Disabilities Act and the Civil Rights Act of 1991, among others).
Furthermore, "[i]n 1996, Congress significantly extended the scope of the [Administrative
Dispute Resolution] Act, by authorizing true binding arbitration for federal agencies,
simplifying the procedural requirements for negotiated rulemaking, and enhancing
confidentiality protections." Developments, supra note 8, at 1860; cf infra Part I.A.3.
76. Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089 (1990)
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-82 (2000)); see also infra Part I.A.3 (discussing
effects of the CJRA).
77. See Kim Dayton, The Myth ofAlternative Dispute Resolution in the FederalCourts,
76 Iowa L. Rev. 889, 957 (1991) ("The time has long since come, not for expanded use of
ADR as a court management tool, but to question more seriously the premises underlying the
ADR movement.").
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broadest range of conflict resolution. We have discovered the relevance
of ADR tools to conflicts that are not on a litigation track-policy
disputes for instance. Without neglecting ADR's importance in litigated
describes the subject;
matters, "alternatives to litigation" no longer
"appropriate dispute resolution" probably does.7 8
Perhaps one of the ADR movement's greatest successes has been the
shift in focus from merely providing an alternative to litigation during a
socially turbulent and increasingly litigious era to offering new perspectives
on common social problems, whether they be purely legal, policy oriented,
or even political.
2. New Trends in the ADR Movement: Judicial Misapplications of ADR
and ADR in Adhesion Contracts
The ADR movement's expansion, however, has not been applauded by
everyone. 7 9 Several recent developments in the ADR movement have been
particularly controversial: judicial misapplication of ADR agreements and
the enforcement of ADR clauses in adhesion contracts. These occurrences
represent a shift in the ADR movement away from its core principles of
voluntariness and party control over process. Furthermore, ADR has been
80
extended beyond private contracts and into court-annexed programs.
These trends in the ADR movement are central to the analysis of how the
tort reform movement eventually borrowed ADR for its own purposes.81
a. JudicialMisapplicationsof ADR
Parties usually agree to participate in ADR voluntarily by signing a
contract with an ADR clause. For example, arbitration is often contracted
for, since the FAA fosters arbitration and state judges may no longer refuse
to honor such agreements merely because they take a dispute out of the
public sphere. 82 Although arbitration has largely been "federalized," 83 the
main impetus for the enforcement of arbitration agreements is still state
84
contract principles, such as party autonomy and specific performance.
78. James F. Henry, Some Reflections on ADR, 2000 J. Disp. Resol. 63, 63.
79. Take, for instance, Richard Reuben's suggestion that ADR distorts, and even has the
potential to completely displace, important aspects of the U.S. legal justice system. See
Reuben, supra note 7, at 582 ("ADR arguably presents one of the greatest challenges
American civil justice has ever encountered.").
80. See, e.g., Katz, supra note 5, at 55 (noting a transformation of ADR during the 1980s
and lamenting that "some forms" of ADR "will probably continue to evolve on their own,
regardless of how precise or imprecise our knowledge").
81. See infra Part I.B.3.
82. See supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
83. See generally Henry C. Strickland, The Federal Arbitration Act's Interstate
Commerce Requirement: What's Left for State Arbitration Law?, 21 Hofstra L. Rev. 385,
396 (1992) (examining the federalization of state arbitration laws).
84. See Dauer & Becker, supra note 20, at 1:59 ("[S]ince arbitration is a creation of
contract, all of the rules of law that apply to all other contracts generally will also apply to
agreements to arbitrate."). Section 2 of the FAA reaffirms this principle and requires that
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This means that parties may contractually agree to use personally crafted
arbitration procedures, and courts are obligated to ensure that parties
comply with their agreements. 85 This combination of federal support and
state laws favorable to arbitration agreements has been central to the
86
success of the ADR movement.
Nevertheless, some scholars suggest that courts are becoming
increasingly more willing to forsake party autonomy and basic contractual
interpretation principles in order to support a broad application of federal
ADR laws. 87 In the case of arbitration agreements, "[iut may be that courts
view the [FAA's] scheme as an easy avenue to clear court dockets.
Applying the FAA... allows courts to hurry parties out of court without
first tackling difficult common law contract remedy analysis. '88 While the
level of misapplication of ADR clauses is not easily measured, it is clear
that the ADR movement's central tenets of voluntariness and party control
over process are not always respected by judges. 89 In fact, some judges are
in "a rush to ride roughshod over individual rights and basic notions of
fairness in the heat of pursuing a popular current goal," thus securing wider
use of ADR. 90
Of course, judges are fully capable of interpreting contractual language
constituting ADR clauses, and the state of judicial misapplications is likely
not as bad as some scholars claim. 9 1 The problem centers on judicial
misunderstanding of what ADR processes involve, 92 rather than an
contract law doctrines such as fraud, duress, and unconscionability are considered in
challenges to the arbitration agreements themselves. Id.
85. Thus, at least in terms of arbitration, there are three levels of legal authority for the
use of ADR: "(1) the FAA; (2) the agreement of the parties; and (3) state arbitration
statutes" and state common law contract principles. Id. at 1:54.
86. While arbitration is generally considered to be the most "enforceable" type of ADR
in light of the FAA, other ADR procedures are fundamentally no different in terms of
enforceability. State contract law principles require enforcement of contractual agreements
to use ADR, regardless of the process selected. See generally Amy J. Schmitz, Refreshing
ContractualAnalysis ofADR Agreements by Curing BipolarAvoidance of Modern Common
Law, 9 Harv. Negot. L. Rev. 1, 4 (2004) (suggesting that while non-arbitration ADR
agreements are enforceable, "[t]he time is ripe to clarify the law applicable to these
agreements and to spark modem contractual enforcement of these non-FAA...
procedures").
87. See id. at 16-21 (describing recent cases in which courts failed to distinguish
between different types of ADR clauses and protect party autonomy).
88. Id. at 26 (footnote omitted).
89. See Reuben, supra note 7, at 596 ("[ADR contract] clauses have been enormously
controversial, raising substantial questions of voluntariness, as well as ones over the ability
of the parties (especially those with lesser power) to make such a knowledgeable choice in
the absence of a specific context.").
90. See generally Jeffrey W. Stempel, Bootstrappingand Slouching Toward Gomorrah:
Arbitral Infatuation and the Decline of Consent, 62 Brook. L. Rev. 1381, 1383 (1996).
91. See, e.g., Schmitz, supra note 86, at 4 (suggesting that the current state of judicial
interpretation of ADR clauses "has left contracting parties lost in a landscape of
'fundamentally aimless, meandering, and above all, confusing' judicial decisions governing
enforcement of ADR agreements" (quoting Macneil, supra note 56, at 172)).
92. For example, Nancy Welsh explains that "[i]n spite of the increasing number of
ADR programs, in courts and communities, mediation remains a largely unfamiliar process
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overzealous judiciary. In other words, unfamiliarity with the many types of
ADR may lead to judicial misapplications. 9 3 Recognizing the dangers
inherent in grouping binding and nonbinding, transformative and
facilitative, and other dissimilar processes together under a single ADR
umbrella, some scholars
even suggest reclassifying arbitration as something
94
other than ADR.
b. ADR in Adhesion Contracts
Considering the strong presumption in favor of enforcing contractual
agreements that call for ADR, 95 and the occasional judicial misapplication
of ADR,96 it is not surprising that ADR has crept into adhesion contracts. 97
Adhesion contracts are not defined by their subject matter, but rather by the
relationship of power between the contracting parties. 9 8 Adhesion contracts
allow the powerful party-i.e., the drafting party--"'to legislate in a
substantially authoritarian manner.' This notion of legislating is not in any
sense figurative. It dramatizes the point that the drafter has the power to
create new and different 'law' to govern the relations and disputes between
99
itself and the adherer."
The relationship between contracting parties is a fundamental concern of
the ADR movement. 10 0
Party control over process, preserving
relationships, and delivering private justice were initially extolled as the
primary benefits of ADR. 10 1
However, these core principles are
to judges, court administrators, citizens and attorneys. Judges, lawyers and clients tend to do
things in the way to which they are accustomed and may resist new processes with which
they are unfamiliar." Nancy A. Welsh, The Thinning Vision of Self-Determination in CourtConnected Mediation: The Inevitable Price of Institutionalization?,6 Harv. Negot. L. Rev.
1, 24 n.95 (2001) (internal quotation marks omitted).
93. Lynn A. Kerbeshian, ADR: To Be Or... ?, 70 N.D. L. Rev. 381, 434 (1994)
("Judges' attitudes toward ADR are dependent upon familiarity; however, a significant
number of judges are unfamiliar with specific ADR procedures.").
94. See, e.g., Jean R. Sternlight, Is Binding Arbitration a Form of ADR?: An Argument
That the Term "ADR "Has Begun to Outlive Its Usefulness, 2000 J.Disp. Resol. 97.
95. See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text.
96. See supra Part I.A.2.i.
97. An adhesion contract is "a privately created document drafted by the dominant party
to a legal relationship and imposed on the adherent without opportunity for negotiation or
change." Stephan Landsman, ADR and the Cost of Compulsion, 57 Stan. L. Rev. 1593, 1596
(2005).
98. See id. at 1602; see also Elizabeth P. Allor, Note, Keating v. Superior Court:
Oppressive Arbitration Clauses in Adhesion Contracts, 71 Cal. L. Rev. 1239, 1247 (1983)
("An adhesion contract is a 'standardized contract, which, imposed and drafted by the party
of superior bargaining strength, relegates to the subscribing party only the opportunity to
adhere to the contract or reject it."' (quoting Neal v. State Farm Ins. Cos., 10 Cal. Rptr. 781,
784 (Ct. App. 1961))).
99. Landsman, supra note 97, at 1602 (quoting Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of
Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract,43 Colum. L. Rev. 629, 640 (1943)).
100. See Robert B. Moberly & Judith Kilpatrick, Introduction: The Arkansas Law
Review Symposium on Alternative Dispute Resolution, 54 Ark. L. Rev. 161, 166-68 (2001).
"ADR can better preserve ongoing party relationships." Id. at 166 (emphasis omitted).
101. Weston, supra note 1, at 592; see also supra notes 4-5, 39 and accompanying text.

2698

FORDHAMLAW REVIEW

[Vol. 75

unquestionably distorted when ADR is used in adhesion contracts. As one
scholar explains,
One of the.., vehicles primarily responsible for driving the growth of
ADR is arbitration mandated by a predispute stipulation. Such a
stipulation is most often contained in form contracts imposed by a
powerful drafting party on a consumer, customer, or employee who has
no choices besides accepting the contract in toto or forgoing the desired
goods, services, or job. This take-it-or-leave-it arrangement has become
ubiquitous, and millions of adhering parties today simply have no choice
but to yield on the question of arbitration [and other ADR processes].
Arrangements of this sort have all the characteristics of the classic
adhesion contract. 102
It is hard to imagine relationships flourishing under such circumstances. 10 3
Furthermore, the ADR procedures included in adhesion contracts are
often less than desirable for the non-drafting party. 104 For example, ADR
clauses in adhesion contracts have been used to "rewrite" consumer
protection laws 105 and establish onerous obstacles and fees that thwart
virtually all claims. 10 6 In one particularly egregious case, an adhesion
contract's ADR clause, requiring arbitration of medical malpractice
disputes, created such a long delay in the process that a patient died before
10 7
his malpractice claim was decided.
The advent of ADR in adhesion contracts represents a controversial shift
within the modem ADR movement: from promoting private justice and
participant autonomy' 0 8 to allowing forced private adjudication, without the
procedural assurances of fairness afforded by the traditional system.' 0 9 The
Supreme Court has fueled this shift, specifically in the context of arbitration

102. Landsman, supra note 97, at 1601-02 (footnotes omitted).
103. See id. at 1602 ("Adhesion contracts can have a dramatic impact on the relationship
between contracting parties.").
104. One study found that ninety-four percent of commercial franchise adhesion contracts
drafted by the principal corporations provided some type of relief, like an escape clause to
avoid arbitration, for the corporate drafters, but not for the franchisees. Id. at 1605 (citing
Christopher R. Drahozal, "Unfair" Arbitration Clauses, 2001 U. Ill. L. Rev. 695, 739).
105. See Landsman, supra note 97, at 1608-09 (describing how ADR in adhesion
contracts has been used to overcome paternalistic protections for consumers embodied in the
Truth in Lending Act and the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act).
106. See id. at 1612-13 (describing adhesion employment contracts that established such
lopsided and expensive ADR processes that employees were effectively "deprived ... of any
realistic opportunity for a hearing").
107. See Engalla v. Permanente Med. Group, Inc., 938 P.2d 903, 913-14 (Cal. 1997); see
also Landsman, supra note 97, at 1614 (describing Engalla).
108. See supra notes 4-5, 39 and accompanying text.
109. See, e.g., Allor, supra note 98, at 1242 (describing how the California Supreme
Court has "recognized a policy of preventing a party with superior bargaining power from
avoiding resolution of numerous small disputes by contractually protecting itself from
classwide proceedings.... [T]he court recognized that the arbitration clause [in an adhesion
contract] may be invalid as to the class of franchisees when it oppressively foreclosed their
ability to bring 'any form of class proceeding"' (quoting Keating v. Superior Court, 645 P.2d
1192, 1207 (Cal. 1982))).
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in adhesion contracts. 10 Over a series of decisions, the Supreme Court has
"embraced a policy liberally favoring arbitration pursuant to the FAA[,]...
enforc[ed] adhesive agreements to arbitrate and [struck] down state
legislation designed to limit such agreements."' I I
Of course, one might argue that adhesion contracts containing ADR
provisions are perfectly consistent with the ADR movement's focus on
securing widespread use of ADR. l2 After all, the FAA, the watershed
event in the early ADR movement, requires courts to enforce all agreements
in which parties choose to use arbitration.113 Nevertheless, non-drafting
signatories of adhesion contracts can hardly be considered voluntary
participants in ADR and have no meaningful opportunity to shape the
process. 114 The Court's recent jurisprudence and the trend among state
judges to encourage-some might argue overencourage-ADR signifies
15
that ADR in adhesion contracts is here to stay.'
But what happens when a state forces disputing parties to use ADR if the
parties never had a contractual relationship in the first place? Another
controversial shift in the ADR movement concerns compulsory ADR, a
process embraced by the modem med-mal tort reform movement.
3. A Radical New Trend: Compulsory ADR
Central to the ADR movement's success was the tenet that ADR is
voluntary and consensually agreed to by the participants, usually by means
of a contract.1 16 For example, "[i]t is frequently stated that arbitration is a
creature of contract. This axiom means that arbitration cannot be imposed
on parties without their consent and that the form of arbitration to be

110. In fact, adhesion contracts may be merely an inevitable, although unfortunate,
phenomenon in light of common law contract principles promoting party autonomy and an
environment of judicial laissez-faire. See generally Kessler, supra note 99.
111. See Landsman, supra note 97, at 1602-04 (outlining the Court's jurisprudence on
arbitration clauses in adhesion contracts under Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500
U.S. 20 (1991); Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987);
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Solar Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 617-19, 640
(1985); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 3-4, 16 (1984); Moses H. Cone Mem'l
Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983); and Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S.
427, 435-37 (1953)).
112. See Jean R. Sternlight, Rethinking the Constitutionality of the Supreme Court's
Preference for Binding Arbitration: A Fresh Assessment of Jury Trial, Separation of
Powers, and Due Process Concerns, 72 Tul. L. Rev. 1, 7-9 (1997) (discussing the
widespread use of adhesion contracts containing ADR clauses).
113. See supra notes 59-63 and accompanying text.
114. See Sternlight, supra note 112, at 6 ("While such arbitration is said to be justified on
the ground that it is voluntary, in fact consumers and employees are given no real
opportunity to choose litigation or other dispute-resolution techniques over arbitration.").
115. See generally Sternlight, supra note 112.
116. In the case of adhesion contracts, the fact that a party signed the contract in the first
place reassures judges who are hesitant to require specific performance of ADR clauses. See,
e.g., Landsmanj supra note 97, at 1596 (discussing enforcement of ADR in adhesion
contracts involving securities disputes as long as the party signed a contract).
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utilized is determined by the parties' agreement." ' 1 7 Similarly, the Model
Standards of Conduct for Mediators stress that "[s]elf-determination is the
fundamental principle of mediation. It requires that the mediation process
rely upon the ability of the parties to reach a voluntary, uncoerced
agreement."",18
However, just as the ADR movement's themes of voluntariness and
preserving party autonomy are distorted by judicial misapplications of
ADR 19 and ADR in adhesion contracts, 120 the ADR movement went down
a new path when federal lawmakers began experimenting with compulsory
ADR. 12 1 In order to avoid confusion of compulsory ADR with voluntary
ADR, a brief description of the two types of voluntary ADR agreements is
provided: pre-dispute ADR agreements and post-dispute ADR agreements.
a. Voluntary ADR: Pre-disputeADR Agreements
Pre-dispute ADR agreements, usually prescribing arbitration as the
method for resolving future disputes, are common contractual provisions.1 22
"Contracting parties often include broadly worded arbitration clauses in
their agreements. Typical is a clause whereby the parties promise to
arbitrate 'all disputes that arise out of or in relation' to a specified
transaction." 123 Parties may also draft a pre-dispute agreement mixing
other ADR processes like mediation and negotiation. 124 These types of
ADR provisions are often unartfully referred to as "mandatory ADR"
because a contracting party is binding himself to participate in ADR, should
a dispute arise, despite objections he might have to the process after the
125
dispute has occurred.

117. Stone, supra note 1, at 378.
118. Landsman, supra note 97, at 1600; see also Model Standards of Conduct for
Mediators

(2005),

available

at

http://www.abanet.org/dispute/documents/model-standardsconductapril2006.pdf.
119. See supra Part I.A.2.a.

120. See supra Part I.A.2.b.
121. See Welsh, supra note 92, at 3-4 ("[T]he originally dominant vision of selfdetermination, which borrowed heavily from concepts of party empowerment, is yielding to
a different vision in the court-connected context."). See generally Lisa Bernstein,
Understandingthe Limits of Court-ConnectedADR: A Critique of Federal Court-Annexed

ArbitrationPrograms,141 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2169 (1993).
122. See Joseph T. McLaughlin, Arbitrability: Current Trends in the United States, 59

Alb. L. Rev. 905, 931 (1996) (suggesting that "[airbitration is strictly a matter of contract;
therefore, a party usually can be compelled to arbitrate only when it has agreed to do so").
123. Stone, supra note 1, at 378 (discussing how broadly or narrowly a judge might
interpret pre-dispute arbitration agreements).
124. Richard Reuben explains, "In the ... pre-dispute setting, the parties have agreed, at
least theoretically, prior to the dispute, to resolve the problem through ADR.... These
clauses often contain mediation, 'med/arb,' early neutral evaluation, and other types of
procedures .... Reuben, supra note 7, at 595-96 (emphasis omitted).
125. See, e.g., Kenneth Gumbiner, An Overview of Alternative Dispute Resolution, in
Alternative Dispute Resolution: The Litigator's Handbook, supra note 3, at 1, 10
("Mandatory arbitration usually arises because of a contract clause that requires it.").

MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ARBITRATION

2007]

2701

There are several reasons pre-dispute ADR agreements are enforced. 126
The Supreme Court sanctions ADR, thereby fostering pre-dispute ADR
agreements, and federal legislation, like the FAA, makes certain types of
ADR agreements enforceable.1 2 7 State contract law principles also require
specific performance of ADR contractual clauses. 128 Additionally, the
United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards, as implemented by the FAA, ensures that arbitration
agreements with foreign parties and foreign arbitral awards are enforced in
9

U.S. courts.

12

b. Voluntary ADR: Post-disputeADR Agreements
On the other hand, parties may agree to use ADR after a dispute has
arisen and litigation has commenced. Courts can encourage settlement
between litigating parties by asking them to agree to use ADR before
proceeding with their lawsuit. 130 Central to this interplay between
traditional adjudication and ADR is the willingness of the parties to
participate in the court-encouraged procedures.131 As one scholar explains,
"Some courts have instituted voluntary arbitration programs in which one
or both parties can choose whether or not to take advantage of an arbitration
service before trial . . . [while] [c]ourt-annexed voluntary mediation is

generally found in courts with access to some external organization willing
to provide mediation and other services."' 132 In both pre-dispute and postdispute agreement scenarios, the parties freely choose to employ ADR
procedures. A quite different scenario is presented when parties have no
say in the matter and are forced to use ADR.

126. It has been suggested that pre-dispute ADR agreements maximize the "private and
social benefits" of ADR because they are not tainted by animosity, which often exists in the
context of post-dispute ADR agreements and thus distorts the ADR process. See Bernstein,
supra note 121, at 2252 n.279.
127. See supra Part I.A. 1.
128. See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text.
129. See Carolyn B. Lamm & David W. Rivkin, International Disputes, in Alternative
Dispute Resolution: The Litigator's Handbook, supra note 3, at 307, 312.
130. Judges often consider Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16 as authorizing them to
encourage litigants to use ADR before proceeding with a lawsuit. See Ralph R. Mabey et al.,
Expanding the Reach of Alternative Dispute Resolution in Bankruptcy: The Legal and
PracticalBases for the Use of Mediation and the Other Forms of ADR, 46 S.C. L. Rev.
1259, 1299 n.148 (1995) (noting that "FRCP 16 [is often considered] the legal predicate
upon which authority for court-annexed mediation has been historically found"); see also
infra note 136.
131. See Reuben, supra note 7, at 595 ("In the post-dispute setting, the parties agree after
a conflict has arisen to have a third party decide the dispute, without resort to courts for
adjudication." (emphasis omitted)).
132. Katz, supra note 5, at 9, 11-12.
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c. Compulsory ADR: No Agreement at All
13 3
Although ADR is usually voluntarily agreed to, parties are sometimes 13 4
forced out of the traditional adjudicatory system and into court-annexed
ADR. 135 For example, some judges require litigants, with no prior
contractual relationship, to use negotiation, mediation, summary jury trials,
and mini-trials based on an interpretation of Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure Rule 16136 that gives judges the authority to facilitate
settlements. 137 Compulsion seeped into the ADR movement gradually.
Initially, state and federal legislators encouraged courts to promote
voluntary ADR in the form of post-dispute ADR agreements. 138 In 1990,
Congress passed the CJRA, which encouraged federal district courts to
using ADR and to consider implementing compulsory
create pilot programs
39
ADR procedures. 1

133. See Reuben, supra note 7, at 594; see also Stone, supra note 1, at 4 ("[S]ince the
1970s, many state and federal courts began to experiment with court-annexed arbitration
systems in which litigants were offered, or in some cases required, to take their claims to an
arbitrator before getting a hearing before a judge.").
134. The concept of "court-annexed ADR" has always involved some aspect of
compulsion:
One of the first proponents of court-annexed ADR was Harvard Law Professor
Frank Sander. In 1979, Professor Sander expressed concern about the increasing
demands placed on courts in the United States and stated that the courts must
He proposed a multi-door
examine other dispute resolution alternatives.
courthouse, in which courts would supply the parties in legal disputes with a
flexible and diverse panoply of dispute resolution processes, with particular types
of cases being assigned to differing processes according to set criteria. [The theory
envisioned] not simply a courthouse but a Dispute Resolution Center, where the
grievant would first be channeled through a screening clerk who would then direct
him to the process ...most appropriate to his case type. In that manner, grievants
would be fitting the forum to the fuss.
James R. Holbrook & Laura M. Gray, Court-Annexed Alternative Dispute Resolution, 21 J.
Contemp. L. 1, 4 (1995) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Note,
Mandatory Mediation and Summary Jury Trial: Guidelinesfor Ensuring Fairand Effective
Processes, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1086, 1087 (1990) (suggesting that court-annexed ADR can be
either voluntary or mandatory).
135. For an overview of the use of ADR in federal courts in the early 1990s, see Dayton,
supra note 77.
136. Fed. R. Civ. P. 16 ("(a) Pretrial Conferences; Objectives. In any action, the court
may in its discretion direct the attorneys for the parties and any unrepresented parties to
appear before it for a conference or conferences before trial for such purposes as (1)
expediting the disposition of the action ... and; (5) facilitating the settlement of the case.").
137. See Katz, supra note 5, at 14-15.
138. See Holbrook & Gray, supra note 134, at 5 ("In May of 1989, the Administrative
Office of the United States Courts (Administrative Office) informed the courts that they
could apply to participate in a pilot program in which ten selected U.S. district courts would
implement a voluntary arbitration program.").
139. See id. at 5 (explaining that the CJRA "required all federal district courts to develop
and implement a Civil Justice Expense and Delay Plan (Plan) to, among other things,
'improve litigation management[,] and ensure just, speedy, and inexpensive resolutions of
civil disputes' (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 471 (2000))).
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Only ten federal courts experimented with compulsory court-annexed
ADR at first.14 0 These early court-annexed ADR programs usually applied
to suits for money damages below a particular amount (ranging between
$50,000 and $150,000) and which did not involve federal constitutional
questions or alleged violations of civil rights. 14 1 Under CJRA programs
implementing compulsory ADR, parties were required to participate in
good faith and were permitted to request a trial de novo after the ADR. 142
Interestingly, some district courts have refused requests for a trial de
novo in cases where a party was found to have not meaningfully
participated in court-annexed arbitration. 143 Soon after the federal courts
began experimenting with compulsory court-annexed ADR, state
legislatures followed suit, at "an increasingly rapid rate." 144 States "began
passing laws requiring parties to participate in an ADR process as a
45
precondition to judicial resolution of their dispute."1
Supporters of compulsory court-annexed ADR argue that it facilitates
settlement by forcing disputants to face the strengths and weaknesses of
their cases at an early stage. 146 However, it would be hard to argue that
compulsory court-annexed ADR furthers the ADR movement's values of
party control over process or more equitable dispute resolution, 14 7 since
parties often end up back in court after the court-annexed process runs its
course. 148 Furthermore, as one commentator noted,
Supporters of court-administered arbitration programs do not generally
expect to change case outcomes. Instead, the distribution of outcomes
prevailing prior to establishing an arbitration program is frequently
viewed as the benchmark for assessing arbitration's effect on equity, and
a program is viewed as successful if it does not perceptibly alter that

140. See Katz, supra note 5, at 17 ("All the pilot plans must include the six 'principles
and guidelines of litigation management and cost and delay reduction' identified in [17
U.S.C.] § 473(a); three of the guidelines refer directly to settlement and ADR." (footnotes
omitted)); see also Reuben, supra note 7, at 583 n.9 ("In 1980, only 10 state courts and one
federal district court had ADR programs. By 1996, nearly half of all federal district courts
used mediation programs and about one-fourth also had arbitration programs." (citation
omitted)).
141. See Bernstein, supra note 121, 2177 n.24, 2178 n.25.
142. Id. at 2182 n.41.
143. Id. at 2183 n.46.
144. Id. at 2172 n.3.
145. Id. at2172.
146. Id. at 2196 n.113.
147. See supra notes 4-5, 39 and accompanying text.
148. In one set of compulsory ADR pilot programs
a party [may] request[] a trial, [in which case] the case is restored to its original
place on the docket and treated as if it had never been arbitrated; neither the record
of the hearing, if made, nor the arbitrator's decision are admissible at trial. In the
pilot districts, trial de novo request rates range from forty-six to seventy-four
percent of arbitrated cases.
Bernstein, supra note 121, at 2183. As will be discussed, the admissibility of the ADR
record and award at trial is a distinguishing feature of states' compulsory court-annexed
med-mal ADR laws. See infra Part I.C.
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distribution to the advantage
or disadvantage of any of the major
49
participants in the system. 1
If court-annexed arbitration is intended to merely replicate the traditional
adjudicatory system, the goal of promoting more equitable or just dispute
50
resolution through ADR is minimized. 1
Despite the distortion of the fundamental ADR principles of
voluntariness and control over process compulsory court-annexed ADR
caused, the process became popular in the late twentieth century. 15 1 At the
same time, the United States experienced a deluge of med-mal lawsuits, and
a national tort reform movement was developing. 152 The stage was set for
the passage of tort-reform legislation that borrowed procedures from the
ADR movement and the new phenomenon of compulsory court-annexed
ADR.
B. The Med-Mal Tort Reform Movement
Part I.B. 1 traces the evolution of the med-mal cause of action and its
history in the U.S. civil justice system. Part I.B.2 focuses particularly on
recent med-mal crises, in which the rate of med-mal lawsuits skyrocketed
and liability insurance became unaffordable. Finally, Part I.B.3 examines
how tort reformers utilize ADR in their efforts to discourage med-mal
lawsuits.
1. Development of the Med-Mal Lawsuit and the Liability Insurance
System
1 53
Medical malpractice is a common law cause of action based in tort.
The earliest med-mal lawsuits relied on legal principles used today. 154
Initially, claims by injured patients were brought in the form of writs of
trespass on the case, intended to secure "damages sustained as the result of
[their physician's] breach of duty, negligence, or carelessness," or, in other

149. Golann, supra note 32, at 518 n.129 (quoting Deborah R. Hensler, What We Know
andDon 't Know About Court-AdministeredArbitration, 69 Judicature 270, 272 (1986)).
150. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
151. See generally Bernstein, supra note 121.
152. See infra Part I.B.1.

153. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 299A (1965) ("Unless he represents that he has
greater or less skill or knowledge, one who undertakes to render services in the practice of a
profession or trade is required to exercise the skill and knowledge normally possessed by
members of that profession or trade in good standing in similar communities.").
154. While the concept of professional malpractice existed in eighteenth century England
and in the American colonies, the modem conception of med-mal emerged in U.S. courts
around the 1840s. See Mohr, supra note 19, at 1732; see also Kenneth Allen De Ville,
Medical Malpractice in Nineteenth-Century America: Origins and Legacy 5-7 (1990)
(describing the origins of the med-mal suit). The development of the modem med-mal
lawsuit, understood in terms of modem tort law, appears to have developed in the midnineteenth century. See id. at 49 (noting that "the first American treatise on tort law,
published by Francis Hillard in 1859, reinforced the essential permanence of the ordinary
skill and care doctrine, as did Amasa Redfield's important Treatise on the Law of Negligence
in 1870").
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words, a failure to exercise "ordinary diligence, care, and skill." 1 55 Juries
156
played a prominent role, even in the earliest med-mal suits.
Interestingly, while "physicians occasionally favored the use of arbitrators
to decide malpractice complaints, by the 1840s it was an uncommon
practice. Jury trials were the almost unalterable rule."' 57 It would take
nearly 130 years before arbitration again became involved in med-mal
58
adjudication.'
In the 1840s, med-mal suits flourished 159 due, in large part, to a series of
cultural and legal developments: "a sharp decline of religious fatalism and
a dramatic rise of religious perfectionism"; increased social attention to
physical fitness and food standards; the opening of the medical and legal
professions to the general public, creating a "marketplace professionalism";
and a trend in U.S. courts towards "relaxing the once-rigid standards for
initiating civil tort proceedings of all sorts."1 6 0 These factors resulted in a
950% increase 61 of medical malpractice suits 162 in state appellate courts
from 1840 to 1860.

155. De Ville, supra note 154, at 5-7 (internal quotation marks omitted) (describing how
attorneys who brought med-mal suits in the late eighteenth century relied on Blackstone's
Commentaries, made available in 1765). Interestingly, Abraham Lincoln's work as an
Illinois attorney played a significant role in developing the "ordinary diligence, care, and
skill" doctrine, at least in that state. Id. at 49, 101 (describing Lincoln's representation of
both patients and physicians in several cases).
156. De Ville explains,
While trial judges articulated the legal standards by which juries were required to
assess physicians, jurors were asked to determine "questions of fact" such as what
constituted carelessness and the standards of the profession at large. Although
expert medical testimony was required to guide the jury's deliberations, laymen
were entrusted with the tremendous power to designate the boundaries of
acceptable medical behavior. Since juries made these decisions on a case-by-case
basis, acceptable standards of care, skill, and diligence were highly sensitive to
popular conceptions of the medical profession and medical practice.
Id.at 6-7.
157. Id. at47.
158. See infra Part I.B.3.
159. See De Ville, supra note 154, at 26 ("[T]he initial explosion of [med-mall litigation
in the 1840s represented a basic, fateful, and irrevocable shift in attitudes toward the
practice.").
160. Mohr, supra note 19, at 1732 (emphasis omitted); see also De Ville, supra note 154,
at 24 (describing a similar set of cultural changes that promoted a med-mal friendly
environment in U.S. courts).
161. Mohr, supra note 19, at 1732; see also De Ville, supra note 154, at 3 (explaining that
the number of med-mal suits may have been even higher in state district courts during this
period).
162. During the early stages of the med-mal lawsuit's development, only the most
unusual injuries formed the basis of claims. But mundane and otherwise common medical
mistakes became more common bases for lawsuits as the med-mal cause of action became
popular in the early nineteenth century. De Ville explains, "[I]n the first third of the
Nineteenth Century malpractice cases typically involved severe deformity, vaccination, or
obstetrics; less severe injuries seldom led to lawsuits. After 1840, however, patients began
to charge physicians for malpractice involving a wider range of treatments" like fractures,
lacerations, and abandonment. De Ville, supra note 154, at 31.
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Ironically, many physicians initially saw the med-mal explosion as "a
useful method of driving charlatans and amateur hacks from the field" and a
needed safeguard to protect the public from "rampant irresponsibility in
medicine." 163 The American Medical Association (AMA) was founded in
1847 to regulate medical education, promote state licensing guidelines, and
develop national standards of practice. 164 The AMA "established a board to
analyze quack remedies and ... [educate] the public."' 165 And "[i]n the
1870s, medical education started its long trek toward excellence and
respectability."' 166 By the 1930s, nearly a decade after the introduction of
the modem med-mal lawsuit, the medical profession no longer was open to
"amateur hacks" and "only the most learned physicians" could practice
16 7
medicine.
Thus, at least during its early stages in the U.S. civil justice system, the
med-mal lawsuit played an important public function: addressing a
dangerous regulatory imbalance. 168 However, med-mal lawsuits continued
to flourish in the years following the implementation of strict regulations
within the medical industry. 16 9 Lawyers stopped suing the "hacks and
quacks," instead focusing on the "best-educated and most successful
physicians."' 170 As the United States experienced a period of innovation
and technological advancement in medical science during the early
twentieth century,171 the industry became more litigious-with
72
experimentation came inevitable failures, leading to more lawsuits. 1
173
As a result, the modem med-mal insurance system developed.
Insurance premiums are meant to reflect a physician's likelihood of being

163. Mohr, supra note 19, at 1732.
164. See id. at 1734.
165. Patricia A. Costante & Janet Spicer Puro, Medical Malpractice: An Historical
Perspective,N.J. Med., July-Aug. 2003, at 21, 22.
166. De Ville, supra note 154, at 90.
167. See Mohr, supra note 19, at 1732.
168. See De Ville, supra note 154, at 87 ("[I]n 1847 one writer recognized that the lack of
effective licensure in most states left to the common law the task of guarding their citizens
by suits for malpractice." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
169. See id. at 187 ("Medical malpractice suits continued to plague physicians through
the last third of the Nineteenth Century. Although the suits and professional responses to
them changed in several important respects, the trends and patterns that surfaced between
1835 and 1865 endured.").
170. Costante & Puro, supra note 165, at 22.
171. See De Ville, supra note 154, at 215-23 (describing medical innovations around the
beginning of the twentieth century).
172. Costante & Puro, supra note 165, at 23; see also De Ville, supra note 154, at 23
("American patients began to sue their physicians on a wide scale because of specific social,
medical, and technological developments ... ").
173. See generally Richard L. Abbott et al., Medical ProfessionalLiability Insurance and
its Relation to Medical Error and Healthcare Risk Management for the Practicing
Physician, 140 J. Opthalmology 1106, 1106 (2005) (describing how the med-mal insurance
industry was "[i]nitially ... provided by large commercial carriers," but, as a result of
insurance crises, "many new malpractice liability companies were founded by physicians").
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sued.174 However, when "insurers set their prices, most of the costs of the
insurance coverage will be incurred only in the future. As a result, insurers
constantly have to imagine the future to decide how to price their products
today. This situation creates a remarkably high degree of uncertainty in
insurance pricing .... "175 Although premiums may fluctuate due to market
uncertainty, securing 76liability insurance is essential to the responsible
practice of medicine. 1
In order to keep insurance premiums down, some physicians feel obliged
to practice "defensive medicine," a process where physicians "substitute
often unnecessary laboratory tests for reliance on their own sound medical
judgments."' 177 Defensive medicine reflects a major consequence of the rise
in med-mal lawsuits and its impact on insurance, but it was not until the late
twentieth century that the insurance system reached a "crisis" level.
2. Recent Med-Mal Insurance Crises
In the 1960s and 1970s, med-mal disputes increased and juries began
awarding astronomical damages in high-profile cases. 178 Insurers increased
premiums, allegedly to keep up with the increasing number and amount of
malpractice judgments; for some physicians, premiums tripled or
quadrupled. 179 Soon "[i]nsurance simply could not be purchased at any
price for most of the nation's physicians in private practice," leading to the
first modem medical malpractice crises in the United States. 180
Again in the 1980s, the rate of med-mal suits increased, and premiums
skyrocketed." 81 Take, for example, New York City's experience from 1977
to 1985: City hospitals, which were entirely self-insured and presumably
paid low premiums, faced an increase in liability payments from about $24
million to nearly $120 million, almost a 400% increase over eight years.1 82
"Doctors in certain specialties, such as obstetrics and gynecology, cut back
174. However, Tom Baker argues that the med-mal insurance industry reflects a "specific
business cycle that consists of alternating periods in which insurance is priced below cost (a
'soft' market) and periods in which insurance is priced above cost (a 'hard' market)." Tom
Baker, Medical Malpracticeand the Insurance UnderwritingCycle, 54 DePaul L. Rev. 393,

396 (2005). In order to tie insurance premiums more closely with actual physician
malpractice risks, a system of experience rating has been proposed. See generally Lori L.
Darling, Note, The Applicability of Experience Rating to Medical MalpracticeInsurance, 38

Case W. Res. L. Rev. 255 (1987).
175. Baker, supra note 174, at 396.
176. See Margaret T. Mangan, The Loss of Chance Doctrine: A Small Price to Pay for

Human Life, 42 S.D. L. Rev. 279, 281 (1997) (suggesting that "[m]edical liability insurance
is mandatory and without it, physicians could not practice medicine because of the risks and
uncertainties placed upon them as a result of medical malpractice litigation").
177. Costante & Puro, supra note 165, at 23.
178. See id.
179. See id.
180. See id. However, the notion that med-mal lawsuits caused the modem medical
insurance crises is controversial; no single cause has been established. See supra note 20 and
accompanying text.
181. See Costante & Puro, supra note 165, at 23.
182. See James E. Hamner III, Medical Malpractice-Tort Reform 6 (1987).
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patients in order
on performing high-risk procedures and treating high-risk
183
to decrease their insurance costs and reduce their risk."'
More recently, "[s]ince late 1999, medical malpractice insurance
premiums have increased at an unprecedented rate"-as high as a 165%
increase in premiums for some specialties between 1999 and 2002.184 To
make matters worse, instead of continuing to raise premiums, some
insurance providers simply abandoned the market altogether, causing the
demand for insurance, and thus the price of premiums, to rise even
higher. 185 "As of 2006, the [AMA] categorized twenty-two states as being
in a 'medical liability crisis' and an additional twenty states as being on the
186
verge of crisis."
Although the effects are palpable, what caused the med-mal insurance
crises is not clear. Some physicians criticize insurers for raising premiums
higher than necessary-exaggerating the impact of frequent med-mal
suits. 187 Other commentators claim the crises were directly correlated to
the rising numbers of lawsuits. 188 Most commentators merely look to the
fact
that juries were awarding excessive malpractice damages more frequently
than ever before and that these awards caused a rise in malpractice
insurance premiums. The existence of the crisis was largely supported by
anecdotal evidence. Other likely causes of higher premiums, such as the
"cyclical pricing and investment practices of insurance companies" were
189
ignored.

The debate over what caused the med-mal insurance crises is fierce, 190 and
whether they were9 1 actually caused by increased threats of med-mal liability
remains unclear. 1
183. See Costante & Puro, supra note 165, at 23-24.
184. Miller, supra note 20, at 1461 n.16 (citing U.S. Gen. Accounting Office (GAO),
Medical Malpractice Insurance: Multiple Factors Have Contributed to Increased Premium
Rates 10 (2003)).
185. Id. at 1461-62.
186. Id. at 1462.
187. See Baker, supra note 174, at 393 ("[T]rial lawyers and others who seek to preserve
existing medical malpractice liability rules commonly report that the high-priced, 'hard
market' phase of the liability insurance underwriting cycle, and not real developments in
malpractice litigation, fueled the medical malpractice insurance crises of the mid-1970s,
mid- 1980s, and early 2000s.").
188. See id. ("[M]edical associations and others who seek further restrictive tort reforms
claim that [the] crises represented the long overdue consequences of escalating tort
costs....").
189. Heather Brann, Utah's Medical Malpractice PrelitigationPanel: Exploring State
ConstitutionalArguments Against a Nonbinding Inadmissible Procedure,2000 Utah L. Rev.
359, 359 (footnote omitted). For an analysis of the cyclical pricing and investment practices
of insurers, see Baker, supra note 174.
190. The insurance crises have become a national issue, often prompting threats of federal
preemption. For example,
[o]n January 16, 2003, President [George W.] Bush delivered a speech at the
University of Scranton in Scranton, Pennsylvania. While standing before a
backdrop emblazoned with the words "Access," "Affordability," and "Quality,"
the President.

.

. [said that] the medical liability system in the United States .. . is
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3. The Tort Reform Movement's Adoption of ADR
Despite uncertainty regarding what caused the med-mal insurance crises,
medical lobbyists have demanded legislative protection from the constant
threat of litigation and rising insurance premiums. 192 Tort reform proposals
have included caps on noneconomic damages, caps on punitive damages,
specialized courts, and certificates of merit, to name only a few. 193 Many
"notable reforms address not the substantive law of medical malpractice,
194
but rather the procedures by which that substantive law is enforced."'
Thus, in response to the med-mal insurance crises of the late twentieth
century, it is not surprising that tort reformers turned to ADR, which had by
then become an integral procedural component of the U.S. civil justice
system, due to the success of the ADR movement. 195
ADR played a prominent role in tort-reform proposals during the 1970s
and 1980s. 196 Tort reformers advocated greater use of ADR on two
separate fronts: (1) in the private world governed by contracts-between
physicians and their patients, as well as between health care providers and
insurers; and (2) in the public sphere-state legislatures under pressure to
reform the procedural process of med-mal litigation.
In the private contractual setting, health care providers began including
ADR provisions in their contracts with patients and insurers, often

"broken." The President believes that "junk lawsuits" will continue to plague the
American people with skyrocketing medical costs and dwindling access to medical
professionals unless the government quickly takes decisive action.
Collin Sult, Note, Questionable Medicine-Why Federal Medical MalpracticeReform May
Be Unconstitutional,47 Ariz. L. Rev. 195, 195 (2005) (footnotes omitted). For a critique of
federal tort reform plans, see Jordyn K. McAfee, Note, Medical Malpractice Crisis
Factionalor Fictional?: An Overview of the GAO Report as Interpretedby the Proponents
and Opponents of Tort Reform, 9 Mich. St. J. Med. & Law 161 (2005).
191. See supra note 20.
192. For example, the American Tort Reform Association, founded in 1986, is "dedicated
to reforming the civil justice system." American Tort Reform Association: Bringing Greater
Fairness, Predictability and Efficiency to the Civil Justice System, http://www.atra.org/about
(last visited Feb. 28, 2007).
193. See generally Miller, supra note 20, at 1458-59 (suggesting that "increased
regulation of the medical profession, regulation of the insurance market, imposition of
certificates of merit at the pretrial stage, and alterations in the manner through which the
standard of care is defined" constitute valid reform proposals).
194. Catherine T. Struve, Doctors, the Adversary System, and Procedural Reform in
Medical Liability Litigation, 72 Fordham L. Rev. 943, 945 (2004) (emphasis omitted)
(describing recent procedural reform proposals, such as screening panels, restrictions on
expert witness qualifications, revisions of remittitur standards, and even the adoption of a
special court system for med-mal cases). It is arguably less controversial, and thus more
achievable, to lobby for procedural changes to the way med-mal suits proceed in court than
to overhaul completely the med-mal cause of action.
195. See supra Part I.A.
196. See, e.g., Hamner, supra note 182, at 8 (listing the recommendation to "encourage
use of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms to resolve cases out of court" as one of
several tort-reform recommendations given to President Ronald Reagan by the Tort Policy
Working Group in 1986).
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19 7
developing a "conflict management" strategy relying heavily on ADR.
This was not a completely new phenomenon in the medical industry;
physicians have recognized that ADR may be productively applied to medmal complaints since the tort's formation.' 98 Recognizing the potential
ADR posed for reducing litigation, health care providers revised their
modern conflict management strategies to encourage voluntary ADR and
began including pre-dispute ADR clauses in contracts. 199 "ADR devices
such as arbitration and mediation were thought of as substitutes for
litigation.... Dissatisfaction with litigation led to an interest in finding
alternative ways to bring a suit to an efficient, even if not a wholly
satisfactory, solution." 20 0 In other words, pre-dispute ADR agreements
were expected to prevent med-mal disputes from reaching courts-a matter
to bring about a more cooperative
particularly interesting to insurers-and
20 1
and equitable health care industry.
However, health care conflict management strategies employing
voluntary ADR got off to a rocky start. 202 Practitioners and health care
managers generally did not have the training or expertise needed to
implement ADR every time a patient complained, and the industry was
unguided by studies explaining best practices. 20 3 Furthermore, in some
health care contexts, it did not take long before pre-dispute ADR
agreements reflected the trend of compulsory ADR. 20 4 For example, Utah
"authorize[d] health care providers to require patients to sign... arbitration
agreements and give up their right to pursue malpractice claims in court or
risk being denied treatment. ' 20 5 Utah's experience is an example of the
distortion of the ADR movement's core principles of voluntariness and
20 6
party control over process, caused by adhesion contracts that use ADR.

197. See generally Dauer & Becker, supra note 20, at 1:35.
198. Arbitrators were sometimes used to review med-mal complaints during the early
nineteenth century, but "by the 1840s it was an uncommon practice." See De Ville, supra
note 154, at 47.
199. Dauer & Becker, supra note 20, at 1:37-38.
200. Id. at 1:5.
201. Id. ("ADR... [can] forestall the development of conflicts into lawsuits, and [can] go
so far back into the transaction or the relationship as to try to prevent the conflict from
arising in the first place.").
202. See id. at 1:4 (suggesting that "ADR in health care had rather a bad false start" and is
underutilized because there is a lack of data on private application of ADR in health care).
203. Id. at 1:30-35 (describing the lack of data but summarizing recent positive case
studies, which suggest that data is becoming more prevalent).
204. See supra Part I.A.2-3.
205. Tony Kreindler, Sponsor of Utah Malpractice Arbitration Bill Now Wants Repeal,
ADRworld.com, Jan. 21, 2004 (on file with the Fordham Law Review).
206. See supra Part I.A.2.b. In fact,
a report by the joint Commission on Health Care Dispute Resolution of the
American Medical Association, the American Bar Association and the American
Arbitration Association ...calls into question the fairness of mandatory arbitration
for medical malpractice claims ... [and suggests that] "[i]n disputes involving
patients, binding forms of dispute resolution should be used only where the parties
agree to do so after a dispute arises [i.e., post-dispute ADR agreements]."
Kreindler, supra note 205.
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Fortunately, data on the use of ADR in health care agreements is becoming
more widely available today and best practices, balancing physicians' and
207
patients' interests, are being developed.
ADR was used quite differently in the public sphere. In the 1990s, state
legislatures, under pressure from medical industry lobbying 20 8 and
encouraged by national experiments with compulsory ADR, 20 9 began
proposing and implementing laws mandating that med-mal lawsuits brought
2 10
in state courts undergo some form of ADR before proceeding to trial.
Legislators have proposed that ADR facilitative and screening processes,
such as "arbitration, summary jury trials, early neutral evaluation or
mediation," be applied to all med-mal lawsuits. 2 11 Most state legislatures
provide only vague justifications for such laws; in one case, merely "to
2 12
control rising health care costs."

These legislative reactions reflect one of the oldest criticisms of the
traditional med-mal adjudicatory system: the alleged inability of ordinary
juries to make fair or competent decisions in cases involving complex
medical procedures. 2 13 Tort reformers have proposed getting rid of juries in

207. See, e.g., Am. Arbitration Ass'n, Am. Bar Ass'n & Am. Med. Ass'n, Commission
On Health Care Dispute Resolution, Final Report (1998), available at http://www.amaassn.org/ama l/pub/upload/mm/395/healthcare.pdf.
208. See, e.g., Doctors Push for Medical Malpractice ADR in WA Ballot Drive,
ADRworld.com, Sept. 20, 2004 (on file with the Fordham Law Review); Wyoming Faces
Key Vote on ADR for Medical Malpractice Claims, ADRworld.com, Oct. 5, 2004 (on file
with the Fordham Law Review) (describing lobbying efforts for and against mandatory
health care-related ADR in Wyoming, Washington, and Kentucky). Medical lobbying has
also reached Congress. See, e.g., Robert Pear, Stung by Defeat in House, H.M.O.'s Seek
Compromise, N.Y. Times, Oct. 9, 1999, at A12. However, should medical industry lobbying
result in federal legislation, the constitutionality of federal health care tort reform is unclear.
See generally Suit, supra note 190.
209. See supra Part I.A.3.c (discussing the ADR movement and the first wave of federal
compulsory court-annexed ADR).
210. See generally Dauer & Becker, supra note 20, at 1:24-30 (outlining health care tort
reformers' early, and arguably unsuccessful, experimentation with ADR).
States have
continued to pass laws experimenting with mandatory ADR into the twenty-first century.
See, e.g., Veto Beaten, Maryland Mandates ADR for Malpractice Claims, ADRworld.com,
Jan. 14, 2005 (on file with the Fordham Law Review) (describing proposed legislation
mandating ADR for state med-mal claims in Maryland, New Jersey, and Washington).
211. See New Jersey Grants New ADR Powers to Judges in Malpractice Cases,
ADRworld.com, June 16, 2004 (on file with the Fordham Law Review) (describing New
Jersey's "sweeping medical malpractice reform plan that authorizes judges presiding in
medical malpractice cases to refer a dispute to arbitration, mediation or other alternative
dispute resolution processes").
212. See, e.g., Wyoming Lawmakers Seek to Mandate Medical Malpractice ADR,
ADRworld.com, June 30, 2004 (on file with the Fordham Law Review) (reprinting draft
Wyoming legislation proposing to amend the Wyoming Constitution to authorize the
legislature to enact measures to control health care costs).
213. See Neil Vidmar, Medical Malpractice and the American Jury: Confronting the
Myths About Jury Incompetence, Deep Pockets, and Outrageous Damage Awards 17-18
(1998); see also De Ville, supra note 154, at 54 (recognizing the common complaint that
"[a] single dissenting voice among the surgeons on the stand is enough to turn the scale in
favor of the plaintiff, toward whom the sympathies of the jury invariably run" (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
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med-mal cases, often advocating for disposition of med-mal cases through
expert panel reviews or allowing judges to sit as fact-finders. 2 14 Not
surprisingly then,
[t]he device known as the medical malpractice screening panel was
among the reform measures initiated by some states during the initial
crisis of the mid-1970s. Typically, a screening panel is comprised of
members of the legal and medical communities who render an opinion
regarding the liability of [the alleged tortfeasor, before a case proceeds to
2
trial]. 15

However, screening panels cannot completely displace juries; rather,
screening panels merely delay med-mal claims from reaching juries.2 16
Essentially, screening panels serve as nonbinding court-annexed
arbitration. 2 17 Claimants and respondents are usually each allowed to
appoint one member of the panel, after which a neutral panel member is
selected by the parties' appointees. 2 18 In most cases, after the panel is
convened, "[t]he patient (and the defending practitioner)... offer a brief
recital of the facts of the claim. The screening panel ... consider[s] those
facts and ...issue[s] an opinion about the probability that the mishap was
the result of negligence. '2 19 The aims of screening panels are primarily to
reduce the flood of med-mal litigation and promote settlement. 220
However, the merger of the ADR and tort reform movements quickly led
to problems. Compulsory med-mal ADR laws generated mixed results and
several states soon repealed them. 22 1 Scholars and lawmakers continue to
214. See Vidmar, supra note 213, at 18.
215. Jean A. Macchiaroli, Medical Malpractice Screening Panels: Proposed Model
Legislation to Cure JudicialIlls, 58 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 181, 186 (1990).
216. See Harold A. Sakayan, Arbitration and Screening Panels: Recent Experience and
Trends, 17 Forum 682, 685-86 (1982).
217. See Dauer & Becker, supra note 20, at 1:26 ("[I]t was recognized (thanks partly to
the ADR crowd) that much of the expense of the law of liability lay in the procedures by
which it was imposed-namely litigation. Therefore one branch of the reform initiative tried
to create systems that would divert some number of the apparently growing volume of
claims away from the courts and into a less dangerous alternative. Thus were born such
devices as medical screening panels."); Sakayan, supra note 216, at 685-86 (equating
screening panels with "mandatory arbitration"); cf supra Part I.A.3.c (describing the
evolution of court-annexed ADR).
218. Sakayan, supra note 216, at 685 ("Since it is perceived that this type of arbitration
provides finality, confidentiality, informality, speed and economy, as well as meeting the
requirements of constitutional due process, selection of arbitration has been recognized as a
proper and effective alternative.").
219. Dauer & Becker, supra note 20, at 1:26.
220. See Sakayan, supra note 216, at 686 (describing the four primary objectives of medmal arbitration as "1.... to weed out unjustified suits; 2. to encourage pretrial settlements of
meritorious claims; 3. to decrease the number of cases which ordinarily go to trial and
thereby reduce court congestion; and 4. [to] reduce the cost of medical care by lowering the
cost of liability insurance").
221. See Miller, supra note 20, at 1483 ("[T]he goal of arbitration panels has failed to be
realized by the various states that have implemented this procedure."); Dauer & Becker,
supra note 20, at 1:26-27 ("The hoped-for reduction in the number of cases going on to trial
has not been achieved, and for those meritorious cases that did go on to trial the cost was
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debate whether compulsory med-mal ADR processes actually alleviate
insurance crises or exacerbate them. 2 22 Also, ADR advocates quickly
realized that compulsory med-mal ADR processes distort fundamental
notions of how ADR should be practiced. 223 Critics of compulsory medmal ADR suggest that ADR should not be used as a "one size fits all"
solution to every med-mal claim and that ADR practiced according to a
court's busy schedule distorts the optimal timing and procedures needed to
224
develop equitable resolutions.
Nevertheless, many compulsory med-mal ADR laws remain on the books
225 Most
and states continue to experiment with new compulsory processes.
common are laws providing for variations on the med-mal screening panel
system, in the form of compulsory court-annexed med-mal arbitration.
C. Compulsory Court-Annexed Med-Mal Arbitration: A Survey of State
Approaches
226
As the pressure on states to reform their med-mal tort systems grew
and the ADR movement achieved national success, 22 7 many states turned to
compulsory court-annexed arbitration as a viable and efficient method of
tort reform. 228 Since the med-mal insurance crises of the 1970s, at least
thirty states have experimented with some variation of compulsory courtannexed med-mal arbitration. 229 Some states require med-mal disputes to

raised rather than reduced by the introduction of an additional procedure required prior to the
ultimate resolution. Many of the mandatory [ADR] programs have likewise been repealed or
allowed to sunset.... [ADR] showed results that were quite mixed when it was used as a
mandatory pretrial device.").
222. See Mitchell J. Nathanson, It's the Economy (and Combined Ratio), Stupid:
Examining the Medical Malpractice Litigation Crisis Myth and the Factors Critical to
Reform, 108 Penn St. L. Rev. 1077, 1079 (2004) ("[Slcreening and arbitration panels
actually increase litigation costs and considerably reduce insurer profitability."); see also
Dauer & Becker, supra note 20, at 1:27.
223. See, e.g., Katz, supra note 5.
224. See Dauer & Becker, supra note 20, at 1:27-28.
225. See supra notes 210-12 and accompanying text (describing recent state proposals for
new laws).
226. See generally Alan Feigenbaum, Note, Special Juries: Deterring Spurious Medical
Malpractice Litigation in State Courts, 24 Cardozo L. Rev. 1361 (2003) (tracing the two
major med-mal crises in the United States during the 1970s and 1980s); Douglas W. Taylor,
Comment, Assessment and Plan for Medical Malpractice: Quality Improvement Through
Mediation, 6 DePaul J. Health Care L. 343, 345 (2003) (examining the social consequences
of medical malpractice).
227. See supra Part I.A.1; see also Christopher S. Kozak, Note, A Review of Federal
Medical Malpractice Tort Reform Alternatives, 19 Seton Hall Legis. J. 599, 638 (1995)
(outlining the benefits of using ADR in med-mal tort reform).
228. See Kozak, supra note 227, at 636 n.192 (providing a comprehensive list of state
med-mal legislation utilizing ADR techniques as of 1995); see also Ellwood F. Oakley III,
The Next Generation of Medical MalpracticeDispute Resolution: Alternatives to Litigation,
21 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 993, 998 (2005) ("Presently, arbitration of medical malpractice claims
is an option in 13 states, and 12 states mandate arbitration in some cases.").
229. See Seavers, supra note 25, at 350-53 (describing twenty-eight states' compulsory
med-mal ADR statutes in appendices I-IV); see also infra Part I.C. 1-3.

2714

FORDHAM LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 75

undergo arbitration before being litigated in court. 230 Others have a similar
effect, giving the judge or the parties themselves discretion as to when a
lawsuit must be diverted to arbitration. 23 1 Common to every law is the
requirement that the dispute be allowed back into the courtroom-either in
the form of a trial de novo or an appeal of the panel's decision. 232
The different state approaches in force today encompass a slew of
creative provisions, usually labeling the ADR procedure as arbitration or a
screening panel. 233

Some state laws require parties who do not improve

their position at the trial phase, after having previously lost in the arbitration
phase, to pay the opponent's costs. 234 Other laws allow penalties for parties
that do not participate in the arbitration procedure in good faith. 2 35 The
most significant defining feature of the different state approaches is whether
the record and decision from the arbitration phase is admissible in
subsequent litigation. 236
This distinction may determine a law's
237
constitutionality.

This section examines the modem state approaches to compulsory courtannexed med-mal arbitration, dividing them into two categories based on
the admissibility of the arbitration result at trial.

230. See Seavers, supra note 25, at 325 ("The majority [of med-mal arbitration systems]
are mandatory, either as a prerequisite to the filing of the complaint or as a requirement prior
to trial, but after the action has been commenced in court.").
231. See id. ("[Some states] provid[e] that panels are to be used only in the discretion of
the presiding judge." (emphasis omitted)).
232. See Redish, supra note 35, at 792 ("[S]ince no jurisdictions make screening panel
decisions binding upon the parties, either party may seek redress in a jury trial."). Of course,
should the parties agree, in the form of a post-dispute ADR agreement, to be bound by the
ADR panel's decision, no jury trial would be afforded. See supra Part I.A.3.b. Redish
explains, "Written agreements to be bound by the panel findings do not violate the right to
jury trial since a party is capable of waiving that right." Redish, supra note 35, at 792 n.204.
233. Initially, compulsory arbitration was seen as a distinctly separate process from the
medical screening panel. See Redish, supra note 35, at 768 (suggesting that "[t]he difference
between screening panels and arbitration is significant: the former is a proceeding held prior
to an actual trial to encourage or induce settlement, rendering a later trial unnecessary; the
latter avoids a trial by vesting full decisionmaking power in the hands of nonjudicial
arbitrators selected by the parties"). However, since the 1970s, as states have experimented
with different compulsory med-mal ADR systems, screening panels and arbitration have
assumed essentially the same function: "a gatekeeper on the path to the courtroom." Dauer
& Becker, supra note 20, at 1:26.
234. See Golann, supra note 32, at 500-02 (describing cost-shifting and security
requirements as the most popular penalty provisions incorporated in compulsory ADR laws).
235. See id. at 502.
236. While Golann suggests that admission of the arbitration result is a "penalty," see id.
at 501-02, this Note considers provisions allowing admission of arbitration evidence at trial
as integral components of certain states' laws. In other words, whether or not a state allows
admission of the arbitration result at trial defines the type of compulsory med-mal ADR at
issue in a constitutional analysis. See infra Part II. In any event, admissibility provisions
likely "discourage ADR participants from proceeding with conventional litigation by
changing the nature of any subsequent trial." Golann, supra note 32, at 501.
237. See infra Part II.
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1. "The Inadmissible Approach": Keeping the Arbitration Result from the
Jury
The "inadmissible approach" describes state laws that require
compulsory court-annexed med-mal arbitration, but proscribe the
introduction of the arbitration record and result as evidence at trial. 238
Although the arbitration panel is directed to "consider all relevant evidence
and decide the issues of liability, amount of damages, and apportionment of
responsibility among the parties," 239 the panel's award is nonbinding and
either party can demand a trial de novo, in which the arbitration record is
inadmissible. 240 States generally following the "inadmissible approach" are
245 Utah, 246
Florida, 2 4' Hawaii, 242 Idaho, 243 Montana, 244 New Mexico,
238. For example, Florida has experimented with creative uses of compulsory arbitration
for med-mal suits since the late 1970s. See Woods v. Holy Cross Hosp., 591 F.2d 1164 (5th
Cir. 1979); see also Fla. Stat. Ann. § 766.107 (West 2005). Florida does not allow
admission of the arbitration result at trial. See id. § 766.107(4)-(5) ("The decision of the
arbitration panel shall not be binding.... After the arbitration award is rendered, any party
may demand a trial de novo in the circuit court ....At the trial de novo, the court shall not
admit evidence that there has been an arbitration proceeding, the nature or the amount of the
award, or any other matter concerning the conduct of the arbitration proceeding ....Panel
members may not be called to testify as to the merits of the case.").
239. Id. § 766.107(3)(b).
240. Id. § 766.107(4)-(5). The Florida law also penalizes parties who reject their
opponent's offer to arbitrate, by limiting the amount or type of damages recoverable at trial,
but this type of provision is uncommon. See id. § 766.209(3)-(4).
241. See supra notes 238-40 and accompanying text.
242. See Haw. Rev. Stat. § 671-12 (2005) ("[A]ny person or the person's representative
claiming that a medical tort has been committed shall submit a statement of the claim to the
medical claim conciliation panel before a suit based on the claim may be commenced in any
court of this State."); see also id. § 671-16 ("No statement made in the course of the hearing
of the medical claim conciliation panel shall be admissible in evidence either as an
admission, to impeach the credibility of a witness, or for any other purpose in any trial of the
action .... No decision, conclusion, finding, or recommendation of the medical claim
conciliation panel on the issue of liability or on the issue of damages shall be admitted into
evidence in any subsequent trial, nor shall any party to the medical claim conciliation panel
hearing, or the counsel or other representative of such party, refer or comment thereon in an
opening statement, an argument, or at any other time, to the court or jury .. ).
243. See Idaho Code Ann. § 6-1001 (2004) ("[P]roceedings shall be informal and
nonbinding, but nonetheless compulsory as a condition precedent to litigation."); see also
Rudd v. Merritt, 66 P.3d 230, 235 (Idaho 2003) (describing the nature of Idaho's screening
panels as "entirely separate" from civil lawsuits, "informal and nonbinding," and noting that
no record is kept").
244. See Mont. Code Ann. § 27-6-701 (2005) ("No malpractice claim may be filed in any
court against a health care provider before an application is made to the panel and its
decision is rendered."); see also id. § 27-6-704 (requiring nondisclosure of panel proceedings
in subsequent court actions).
245. See N.M. Stat. Ann. § 41-5-15 (LexisNexis 1996) ("No malpractice action may be
filed in any court against a qualifying health care provider before application is made to the
medical review commission and its decision is rendered."); id. § 41-5-20(A)-(D) ("The
deliberations of the panel shall be and remain confidential .... The report of the medical
review panel shall not be admissible as evidence in any action subsequently brought in a
court of law.").
246. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-12(l)(c) (2002) ("The proceedings are informal,
nonbinding, and.., are compulsory as a condition precedent to commencing litigation."); id.
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Wisconsin, 247 Wyoming, 24 8 and Washington. 249 Interestingly, Ohio 250
provides for voluntary arbitration, but dictates that the arbitration result is
inadmissible at trial. 25 1
2. "The Admissible Approach": Allowing Admission of the Arbitration
Result at Trial
The "the admissible approach" describes state compulsory court-annexed
med-mal arbitration laws that allow admission of the arbitration record and
result as evidence at trial. For example, in Delaware, 2 52 the panel reports its
findings regarding liability directly to the court in which litigation is
pending, such findings constituting prima facie evidence of liability at
trial. 2 53 An adversely affected party may petition the court to review the

254
panel's findings, and the complete panel record is admissible in court.
"Thus, [in systems following the admissible approach] if a disputant loses
in arbitration and demands a trial, the fact that he lost, and perhaps the

§ 78-14-15(1)-(2) ("Evidence of the proceedings conducted by the medical review panel and
its results, opinions, findings, and determinations are not admissible as evidence in an action
subsequently brought by the claimant in a court of competent jurisdiction.... No panelist
may be compelled to testify in a civil action subsequently filed with regard to the subject
matter of the panel's review.").
247. See Wis. Stat. Ann. § 655.44(5) (West 2004) ("[N]o court action may be commenced
unless a request for mediation has been filed under this section and until the expiration of the
mediation period ... "); id. § 655.58 (describing the confidential nature of the mediation
proceedings). Wisconsin's compulsory med-mal ADR system details the procedures for
appointing the panel, but does not govern how the process should be conducted. See id. §
655.465. Although the process is referred to as "mediation," the compulsory nature of the
law makes it similar to other states' compulsory arbitration systems.
248. See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 9-2-1518(a) (2005) ("[N]o complaint alleging malpractice
shall be filed in any court against a health care provider before a claim is made to the panel
and its decision is rendered."); id. § 9-2-1523 (requiring panel records to be kept private and
proscribing calling of panel members at trial).
249. See Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 7.70.100 (West Supp. 2007) (providing for mandatory
court-ordered mediation for all health care claims).
250. See Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2711.21(A) (LexisNexis 2000) ("[I]f all of the parties to
the medical, dental, optometric, or chiropractic claim agree to submit it to nonbinding
arbitration, the controversy shall be submitted to an arbitration board consisting of three
arbitrators to be named by the court.").
25 1. See id. § 2711.21(C) ("If the decision of the arbitration board is not accepted by all
parties to the medical, dental, optometric, or chiropractic claim, the claim shall proceed as if
it had not been submitted to nonbinding arbitration pursuant to this section. The decision of
the arbitration board and any dissenting opinion written by any board member are not
admissible into evidence at the trial.").
252. See Del. Code Ann. tit. 18, § 6802 (1999) ("In any civil action alleging medical
negligence at any time after the filing of an answer or any motion filed in lieu thereof, any
party shall have the right to convene a medical negligence review panel .... "); id. § 6808
(providing the panel with "the authority to subpoena witnesses, administer oaths and compel
the production of documents").
253. See id. § 6811 (b)-(c). In other states, "[tihe ADR outcome may... shift the burden
of proof at trial." Golann, supra note 32, at 502.
254. Del. Code Ann. tit. 18, § 6811 (d), (f).
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amount of any finding2 against
him, will be evidence which any later judge
55
or jury may consider."
2 56 are Delaware, 257
States generally following the admissible approach
260
25 9
2 58
Maryland, 262
Maine, 26 1
Louisiana,
Kansas,
Indiana,
263
264
265
266
Massachusetts,
Michigan, Nebraska,
and Virginia.
Although no
longer in force, Vermont 267 and Wyoming 26 8 once had laws following the
255. Golann, supra note 32, at 502.
256. Interestingly, Delaware courts have held that the system by which the panel reports
its findings to the court does not violate the Seventh Amendment right to trial or the
Fourteenth Amendment due process protections. See Del. Code Ann. tit. 18, § 6811
(describing Delaware cases in the note and comments section); see also infra Part II.
Commentators suggest that the admissible approach is unextraordinary. See Feigenbaum,
supra note 226, at 1379 n. 105 (discussing states with mandatory screening panels).
257. See supra notes 252-54 and accompanying text.
258. See Ind. Code Ann. §§ 34-18-8-4, -6 (LexisNexis 1998) (requiring panel review as a
condition precedent to filing any med-mal lawsuit involving more than $15,000). The panel
opinion is admissible in court. See id. § 34-18-10-23.
259. See Kan. Stat. Ann. § 65-4901 (2002) (describing formation of the panel); id. § 654904 (requiring the panel to issue an opinion, which is delivered to the parties and the
presiding judge and which "shall be admissible in any subsequent legal proceeding, and
either party may subpoena any and all members of the panel as witnesses for examination
relating to the issues at trial").
260. See La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 40:1299.47 (Supp. 2007). Subsection (H) dictates that
"[a]ny report of the expert opinion reached by the medical review panel shall be admissible
as evidence in any action subsequently brought by the claimant in a court of law, but such
expert opinion shall not be conclusive and either party shall have the right to call, at his cost,
any member of the medical review panel as a witness." Id. § 40:1299.47(H).
261. See Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 24, §§ 2851, 2852, 2857 (2000). Under Maine's system,
only unanimous findings are admissible in court, id. § 2857(B), and the panel may not decide
"dispositive legal affirmative defenses, and comparative negligence," id. § 2853(5) (Supp.
2006).
262. See Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 3-2A-06(d) (LexisNexis 2006) ("Unless
vacated by the court... , the unmodified arbitration award is admissible as evidence in the
judicial proceeding. The award shall be presumed to be correct, and the burden is on the
party rejecting it to prove that it is not correct.")
263. See Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 231, § 60B (LexisNexis 2000) (establishing the criteria for
convening a med-mal review tribunal and establishing that "[t]he testimony of said witness
and the decision of the tribunal shall be admissible as evidence at a trial").
264. See Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 600.4915 (West 2000) (establishing a system of
compulsory "mediation," which is, in fact, just like arbitration because, "within 14 days after
the mediation hearing, the panel shall make an evaluation and notify the attorney for each
party of its evaluation in writing. The evaluation shall include a specific finding on the
applicable standard of care"); id. § 600.4919 (establishing procedures for use of the
mediation panel's evaluation if the parties proceed to trial).
265. See Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 44-2840, 44-2841, 44-2844(2) (2004). Since the claimant
may waive his "right" to the panel's review, Nebraska's law could be classified as voluntary
med-mal arbitration.
266. See Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-581.2 (Supp. 2006) (establishing that any party may
convene a review panel); id. § 8.01-581.8 (2000) (allowing for admission of the panel
opinion at trial and the right to call panel members as witnesses).
267. See Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 7002 (2002). Today in Vermont, "persons asserting a
claim based on medical malpractice may submit the claim in writing to arbitration prior to
the commencement of any trial as to said claim, but not thereafter, providing that all parties
having an interest in the claim agree to arbitration," thus establishing a system of voluntary
med-mal arbitration. Id.
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admissible approach, and the District of Columbia has experimented with
procedures similar to the admissible approach. 269
3. Miscellaneous Provisions in Compulsory Court-Annexed Med-Mal
Arbitration Laws
Some states encourage parties involved in any lawsuit meeting certain
criteria, irrespective of the lawsuit's subject matter, to undergo arbitration
270
or some form of ADR before being litigated ("across-the-board ADR").
These state laws resemble the federal courts' use of court-annexed ADR in
States with across-the-board ADR statutes include
the 1990s. 27 1
273 North Carolina, 274 North Dakota,2 75
Minnesota, 272 New Jersey,277
Oregon, 276 and Pennsylvania.
Some states have compulsory court-annexed med-mal arbitration laws,
but also provide for a controversial fee-shifting provision. 278 After
arbitration and before proceeding on a complaint, the plaintiff must post a
bond that goes towards paying the defendant's costs if the plaintiff loses at
268. See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 9-2-1501 (1986). In Hoem v. State, 756 P.2d 780, 782 (Wyo.
1988), the Supreme Court of Wyoming held the 1986 Wyoming Medical Review Panel
Act-which followed the admissible approach-unconstitutional on equal protection
grounds because the "act treats medical malpractice victims differently than those injured by
the tortious conduct of someone other than a health care provider in that only medical
malpractice victims are prohibited from filing a claim for personal injury directly in court."
Today, Wyoming follows the inadmissible approach. See supra note 248 and accompanying
text.
269. See McCulloch, Campbell & Lane LLP, Summary of Medical Malpractice Law:
District of Columbia, http://www.mcandl.com/dc.html (last visited Mar. 16, 2007).
270. Commentators have debated the viability of mandatory arbitration for all civil
claims. See generally Lisa B. Bingham, Why Suppose? Let's Find Out: A Public Policy
Research Program on Dispute Resolution, 2002 J. Disp. Resol. 101, 105-06, 105 n.18; Leo
Kanowitz, Alternative Dispute Resolution and the Public Interest: The Arbitration
Experience,38 Hastings L.J. 239, 286 (1987).
271. See supra Part I.A.3.c.
272. See Minn. Stat. Ann. § 484.74 (West 2002) (establishing the possibility of courtordered, nonbinding ADR for any civil suit over $7,500 in select districts).
273. See N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 2A:23A-20, -28 (West 2000) (providing for mandatory,
nonbinding arbitration for any civil claim $20,000 or less).
274. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-38.1 (2005) (providing for mandatory court-ordered
mediation for all civil actions).
275. See N.D. Cent. Code, § 32-42-03 (1996) (mandating good-faith effort to use ADR
before filing complaint).
276. See Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 36.400 (West Supp. 2006) (providing for mandatory
arbitration of matters involving $50,000 or less in all circuit courts).
277. See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 7361 (1998) (providing for mandatory arbitration for
certain claims involving $50,000 or less). However, even though Pennsylvania requires
arbitration for any suit involving $50,000 or less, the constitutionality of compulsory medmal arbitration in the state is unclear. In Mattos v. Thompson, 421 A.2d 190, 196 (Pa. 1980),
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court declared the Pennsylvania compulsory med-mal arbitration
statute unconstitutional "because the delays involved in processing these claims under the
prescribed procedures set up under the Act result in an oppressive delay and impermissibly
infringes upon the constitutional right to a jury."
278. Golann describes common penalty provisions in mandatory ADR laws. Golann,
supra note 32, at 500-01.
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trial. 279 States with a cost-shifting component of their compulsory court-

annexed med-mal arbitration systems are Massachusetts, 280 Michigan, 28 1
2 84
Oregon, 282 Wisconsin, 283 and formerly Nevada.
Some state laws include provisions complicating categorization. For
example, compulsory med-mal arbitration laws include different provisions
for when arbitration shall be judge-ordered, party-requested, or simply a
condition precedent to filing a complaint. 285 Additionally, some laws only
require certain issues in med-mal lawsuits, such as the issue of damages, to
286
undergo court-annexed ADR.

II. CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO COMPULSORY COURT-ANNEXED
MED-MAL ARBITRATION

Regardless of the approach adopted, any state law mandating courtannexed med-mal arbitration implicates the Seventh Amendment right to
jury trial 287 and Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment guarantees of due process
and equal protection of the laws. 288 Compulsory court-annexed med-mal
arbitration laws may also violate state constitutional protections, depending
on the jurisdiction. 289 Anticipating these constitutional issues, states
279. See, e.g., Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 231, § 60B (LexisNexis 2000) ("If a finding is made
for the defendant or defendants in the [panel phase of the] case the plaintiff may pursue the
claim through the usual judicial process only upon filing bond in the amount of six thousand
dollars ... payable to the defendant or defendants in the case for costs assessed .... [A]
single justice may, within his discretion, increase the amount of the bond required to be
filed.").
280. Id.
281. See Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 600.4921 (West 2000) ("If a party has rejected an
evaluation and the action proceeds to trial, that party shall pay the opposing party's actual
costs unless the verdict is more favorable to the rejecting party than the mediation [panel]
evaluation.").
282. See Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 36.400, 36.425 (West Supp. 2006) (requiring arbitration
of any civil claim less than $50,000 in Oregon circuit courts, while providing a right to a trial
de novo, but also requiring a claimant to pay his opponent's attorney fees if the claimant's
position is not improved after trial).
283. See Wis. Stat. Ann. § 655.61 (West 2004) (establishing a mediation fund and
requiring contributions from health care providers).
284. See Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 41A.016 (LexisNexis 2001) (repealed 2002).
285. See supra notes 230-31 and accompanying text.
286. See, e.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 3045 (McKinney 1991) (allowing a defendant to concede
liability and file for compulsory arbitration regarding damages issues only).
287. See Paul B. Weiss, Reforming Tort Reform: Is There Substance to the Seventh
Amendment?, 38 Cath. U. L. Rev. 737, 742 n.32 (1989) (suggesting that "plaintiffs have
argued, with little success, that mandatory submission of a plaintiff's claim to a medical
malpractice review or arbitration panel before the plaintiff may proceed in the courts
constitutes a denial of the plaintiffs right to trial by jury"); Kozak, supra note 227, at 640
("Admission of panel findings has been contested, rather unsuccessfully, as a violation of the
Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial.").
288. See Golann, supra note 32, at 493. Other constitutional issues implicated by
compulsory court-annexed med-mal ADR laws include principles of federalism, access to
courts, and separation of powers. Id.
289. For example, "every state except Colorado and Louisiana ... provide[] a jury trial
guarantee in civil cases through [their] state constitution." Seavers, supra note 25, at 328.
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drafted their laws so that the losing party in arbitration is always afforded a
full trial. 290 In other words, compulsory med-mal arbitration systems delay,
but do not deny, plaintiffs' ability to bring med-mal lawsuits in court. 29 1
Thus, defenders of the laws argue that, although compulsory in nature, the
laws merely add an extra procedural hurdle in med-mal lawsuits, thereby
29 2
preserving the traditional adjudicatory system.
Nevertheless, the question remains: Is the extra procedural hurdle
constitutional? The answer often depends on whether a state's system
follows the admissible or inadmissible approach. 293 Federal courts have
tended to reject constitutional challenges to compulsory court-annexed
med-mal arbitration laws. 294 Some state courts strike the laws down as
violating constitutional guarantees, 2 95 while other state courts uphold them
as constitutional. 296 Additionally, "[i]n some instances. .. [laws] have
2 97
been accepted in theory, but adjudged unconstitutional in operation."
Part II examines constitutional challenges to compulsory court-annexed
med-mal arbitration laws, both in federal and state courts, and explains why
the laws have sometimes been upheld as constitutional and other times
declared unconstitutional. Particular attention is paid to the most notable
cases analyzing the constitutionality of compulsory court-annexed med-mal
arbitration laws.

290. Redish, supra note 35, at 792 ("On first appearances, claiming a threat to the jury
trial right may seem puzzling: since no jurisdictions make screening panel decisions binding
upon the parties, either party may seek redress in a jury trial.").
291. Delaying a claimant's right to trial is generally not considered an unconstitutional
denial of that right or of due process rights afforded by most states and the Federal
Constitution. See infra note 306 and accompanying text.
292. See infra notes 306-07 and cases cited therein.
293. See supra Part I.C.
294. Compare infra Part II.A. 1, with infra Part II.B. 1.
295. See, e.g., Wright v. Central Du Page Hosp. Ass'n, 347 N.E.2d 736 (I11.
1976);
Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125, 125 (N.D. 1978); Mattos v. Thompson, 421 A.2d 190
(Pa. 1980); see also infra Part II.B.2.
296. See, e.g., Johnson v. St. Vincent Hosp., Inc., 404 N.E.2d 585 (Ind.1980); Att'y Gen.
v. Johnson, 385 A.2d 57 (Md. 1978) (overruling a lower court opinion holding the Maryland
law mandating arbitration to be unconstitutional because the arbitration panel did not have
final adjudicatory power and the claimant was ultimately allowed to exercise his right to
trial); Prendergast v. Nelson, 256 N.W.2d 657 (Neb. 1977); Beatty v. Akron City Hosp., 424
N.E.2d 586 (Ohio 1981); State ex rel. Strykowski v. Wilkie, 261 N.W.2d 434 (Wis. 1978);
see also infra Part II.A.2. In Beatty, the Supreme Court of Ohio held that mandatory
arbitration was compatible with the constitutional rights to a jury trial, Beatty, 424 N.E.2d at
590-91 (citing U.S. Const. amend. VII; Ohio Const. art. 1, § 5), and equal protection, id. at
591-95 (citing U.S. Const. amend XIV; Ohio Const. art. 1, § 2). The Ohio compulsory medmal arbitration law has since been amended and now only provides for arbitration of medmal claims if both parties agree. See Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2711.21 (LexisNexis Supp.
2006); see also supra notes 250-51 and accompanying text.
297. Golann, supra note 32, at 493; see also infra notes 400-03 and accompanying text.
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A. Compulsory Court-Annexed Med-Mal Arbitration Is Constitutional
Part II.A.1 examines federal cases that have declared compulsory courtannexed med-mal arbitration laws constitutional. Part II.A.2 examines state
cases that have held similarly.
1. Federal Cases Upholding Compulsory Med-Mal Arbitration Laws
When med-mal claims are heard in federal court, 298 the most common
constitutional challenge to compulsory court-annexed med-mal arbitration
is based on the Seventh Amendment, or a state constitutional equivalent,
right to jury trial. 299 Med-mal claims derive from common law causes of
action 300 and thus must receive a jury trial in federal courts. 30 1 However, as
noted, no compulsory court-annexed med-mal arbitration law completely
denies parties the opportunity to present their case
to a jury. 30 2 Thus, right
30 3
unsuccessful.
usually
are
to jury trial challenges
298. "Under the doctrine of Erie Railroadv. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), federal courts
sitting in diversity apply federal procedural rules but decide substantive issues of law in
accord with applicable state law." Hum v. Dericks, 162 F.R.D. 628, 635 (D. Haw. 1995).
Federal courts considering med-mal claims usually have jurisdiction based on diversity, see
28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2000), and tend to declare med-mal statutes to be substantive state law for
Erie purposes. See, e.g., Feinstein v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 643 F.2d 880 (1st Cir. 1981);
Edelson v. Soricelli, 610 F.2d 131 (3d Cir. 1979); Daniel v. Jones, No. 4:96CV00024, 1996
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15436 (E.D. Va. May 3, 1996) (sitting in diversity because the plaintiff
had moved from Virginia since the alleged malpractice, yet referring the lawsuit to
arbitration pursuant to Virginia's compulsory arbitration statute); Hill v. Morrison, 870 F.
Supp. 978 (W.D. Mo. 1994); Hines v. Elkhart Gen. Hosp., 465 F. Supp. 421, 423-25 (N.D.
Ind. 1979) (analyzing Indiana's compulsory med-mal arbitration statute in light of federal
diversity jurisdiction jurisprudence, ultimately concluding that "[i]t
cannot be logically
argued that the [statute] does not, by its own terms, apply to diversity claims pending before
this Court"); Davison v. Sinai Hosp. of Balt., Inc., 462 F. Supp. 778, 781 (D. Md. 1978),
aff'dper curiam, 617 F.2d 361 (4th Cir. 1980). But see Hum, 162 F.R.D. at 635-37 (refusing
to require a class of med-mal plaintiffs to undergo Hawaii's compulsory med-mal arbitration
process when suing in federal court); Adkins v. Commonwealth of Va. ex rel. Univ. of Va.
Med. Ctr., 154 F.R.D. 139, 141 (W.D. Va. 1994) (refusing to apply Virginia's compulsory
med-mal arbitration statute in a federal diversity case, based on the plain language of the
statute); Wheeler v. Shoemaker, 78 F.R.D. 218, 229 (D.R.I. 1978) (refusing to apply Rhode
Island's compulsory med-mal arbitration law when a med-mal claim was being heard in
federal court on diversity jurisdiction). For a discussion of preemption and choice of law
issues regarding med-mal claims in federal courts, see Golann, supra note 32, at 561-64.
299. See Golann, supra note 32, at 502.
300. See supra note 153 and accompanying text; see also Golann, supra note 32, at 505
n.69 (explaining that "legislatures could not impose binding ADR on medical malpractice
claims because such claims clearly exist at common law" (citing Redish, supra note 35, at
797-98)).
301. Since the Seventh Amendment preserves the right of trial by jury in suits at common
law as of the time the Seventh Amendment was ratified, but does not guarantee a jury trial
for every legal claim, only historically valid or newly created causes of action "which
closely resemble common law claims" must be presented to a jury. See Golann, supra note
32, at 502-03. Med-mal claims exist at common law and thus fall within the scope of the
Seventh Amendment. See Redish, supra note 35, at 797-98.
302. See supra note 232 and accompanying text. Of course, should a state completely
eliminate the med-mal cause of action, no jury trial rights would exist. See, e.g., Golann,
supra note 32, at 504 ("For example, the right of an employee to sue his employer in tort for
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Federal courts that reject right to jury trial challenges to compulsory
med-mal arbitration laws consider dispositive the fact that a jury trial is
ultimately afforded. 30 4 For example, in rejecting a challenge to a Florida
law mandating med-mal arbitration, the Fifth Circuit explained that
[n]othing in the seventh amendment requires that a jury make its findings
at the earliest possible moment in the course of civil litigation; the
requirement is only that the jury ultimately determine the issues of fact
if
30 5
they cannot be settled by the parties or determined as a matter of law.
This rationale follows Supreme Court precedent holding that delayed
access to a jury does not violate the Seventh Amendment, so long as delays
30 6
or conditions placed on the right to jury trial are "reasonable."
Compulsory court-annexed med-mal arbitration laws that withstand
Seventh Amendment challenges must not impose unreasonable burdens on
litigants' jury trial rights. 30 7
job-related injuries has been abolished in many states and replaced by worker's
compensation statutes. Under such laws, an employee no longer needs to prove employer
negligence in order to recover, but must submit all other issues concerning his injury claim
to binding arbitration by an administrative agency. The traditional jury trial has been
eliminated as an option .. "). So far, no state has completely eliminated the med-mal cause
of action. See generallyRedish, supra note 35, at 797-98.
303. See Weiss, supra note 287, at 742 n.32 ("[P]laintiffs have argued, with little success,
that mandatory submission of a plaintiff's claim to a medical malpractice review or
arbitration panel before the plaintiff may proceed in the courts constitutes a denial of the
plaintiffs right to trial by jury.").
304. See, e.g., Hines v. Elkhart Gen. Hosp., 465 F. Supp. 421, 426 (N.D. Ind. 1979)
(rejecting a claimant's Seventh Amendment challenges because "[u]nquestionably, the [state
law] does not foreclose a medical malpractice claimant's right to have his claim against a
qualified health care provider tried before a jury; rather, the [law] requires that the claimant
first participate in the medical review panel procedure described in the [law] and permits the
admissibility of the resulting determination as an expert opinion and further permits panel
members to be called as witnesses at trial").
305. Woods v. Holy Cross Hosp., 591 F.2d 1164, 1178 (5th Cir. 1979) (emphasis
omitted). The court went on to conclude that
[o]nce the [court-annexed] panel has considered the evidence and rendered its
decision either party to the claim is free to proceed to a jury trial; the jury will
remain the ultimate arbiter of the case. So long as [the plaintiffs] right to have her
claim fully and finally determined by a jury is preserved, she cannot be heard to
complain that her right to a jury trial has been unconstitutionally restricted.
Id. at 1179.
306. See Golann, supra note 32, at 506. "Courts should ask, in effect, whether an
innovation challenged under the Seventh Amendment serves the basic purposes of
adjudicative procedure-speed, low cost, and just results-as well as the traditional process
it replaces." Id. at 516. The Supreme Court has established the reasonableness standard to be
applied to procedural innovations that legislatures may devise. See Ex parte Peterson, 253
U.S. 300, 309-10 (1920) (applying the reasonableness standard in rejecting a Seventh
Amendment challenge to a judge's determination to allow an "auditor" to review evidence
and issue a report that could be introduced at trial); Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1
(1899) (declaring a plan that diverted jury trials to justices of the peace not to violate the
Seventh Amendment because the justices' of the peace decisions were nonbinding and the
procedure furthered a reasonable state interest).
307. See Katz, supra note 5, at 23 ("Generally, the benefits of arbitration, such as speed
and the elimination of frivolous suits, outweigh the burdens, such as delay in obtaining a jury
trial, and so the procedure is deemed reasonable.").
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The difference between the admissible and inadmissible approaches
appears to make little difference in right to jury trial challenges in federal
courts. The Fifth Circuit suggests that
[t]he panel finding is a particularly relevant, but not conclusive, form of
evidence. The parties to a malpractice dispute are free to present the same
witnesses and exhibits before the trial jury that they presented to the
mediation panel, and the jury may draw its own conclusions
from their
30 8
testimony, even if in so doing it rejects the panel's finding.
Most circuits considering the issue are in accordance. 309 However, it has
been suggested that by introducing the arbitration record and award as
evidence in the subsequent trial, "the jury may be so swayed by those
findings that the party who lost at the... [arbitration] stage will-in
substance, if not in form-also lose the right to jury trial. ' 3 10 This
argument has not been successful at the federal level, 3 11 perhaps because
federal courts routinely allow introduction of appointed fact-finders'
opinions and recommendations at trial. 3 12 According to one commentator,
"There is no apparent reason why the results of an ADR proceeding cannot
be critiqued at trial as effectively as the report of a master or neutral
expert. '3 13 In any event, laws following the inadmissible approach should

308. Woods, 591 F.2d at 1180; see also Hines, 465 F. Supp. at 428 (equating the ADR
panel's findings with expert opinions, which are authorized as admissible under federal
evidence rules).
309. See, e.g., Seoane v. Ortho Pharm., Inc., 660 F.2d 146, 149 (5th Cir. 1981) ("The
statutes clearly prescribe that the panel's report constitutes no more than expert opinion
evidence, the use of which is not incompatible with the seventh amendment." (footnote
omitted)); Davison v. Sinai Hosp. of Balt., Inc., 462 F. Supp. 778, 781 (D. Md. 1978), affd
per curiam, 617 F.2d 361 (4th Cir. 1980) ("This provision only establishes a rebuttal
presumption. It cuts off no defense, interposes no obstacle to a full contestation of all the
issues, and takes no question of fact from either court or jury. At most, therefore, it is
merely a rule of evidence. It does not abridge the right of trial by jury, or take away any of
its incidents." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
310. Redish, supra note 35, at 792.
311. However, the argument has been considered by New York and Ohio state courts. See
Comiskey v. Arlen, 390 N.Y.S.2d 122, 126 (App. Div. 1976) (rejecting the argument and
overturning a trial court ruling declaring New York's compulsory med-mal mediation statute
unconstitutional); Simon v. St. Elizabeth Med. Ctr., 355 N.E.2d 903, 908 (Ohio C.P. 1976)
(agreeing with the argument and declaring Ohio's compulsory med-mal arbitration statute
unconstitutional).
312. See, e.g., Gronne v. Abrams, 793 F.2d 74, 78 (2d Cir. 1986) ("[T]he seventh
amendment merely requires 'that the ultimate determination of issues of fact by the jury be
not interfered with.' Under [the New York compulsory med-mal arbitration law], the jury
remains the final arbiter of factual questions raised at trial. The panel's recommendation, if
unanimous and therefore admissible at trial, is in effect an expert opinion which is to be
evaluated by the jury in the same manner as it would evaluate any other expert opinion."
(quoting In re Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 310 (1920))); see also Golann, supra note 32, at 51315 (comparing admission of the arbitration record to admission of an auditor's report, which
the Supreme Court has held does not infringe on Seventh Amendment guarantees, because
"the auditor's findings could be questioned and rebutted").
313. See generally Golann, supra note 32, at 542-43.
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have no problem overcoming right to jury trial challenges since the trial
3 14
phase is unaffected.
Compulsory court-annexed med-mal arbitration laws have also been
challenged on due process grounds in federal courts, but with little
success. 3 15 The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments guarantee that the
federal and state governments shall not deprive any person of "life, liberty,
or property," without due process of law. 3 16 This guarantee has been
interpreted as a right to procedural due process: "The Supreme Court has
characterized the right as 'an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time
and in a meaningful manner' which is 'appropriate to the nature of the
case."' 3 17 The main due process issue involved in compulsory courtannexed med-mal arbitration "is whether [the arbitration process]
constitutes an unreasonable barrier to disputants' access to court, or
3 18
unreasonably impairs the quality of the later adjudicative hearing."
Federal courts have tended to reject due process challenges to
compulsory court-annexed med-mal arbitration laws. Federal courts reason
that merely delaying due process does not automatically deny due
process. 3 19 Interestingly, in upholding Indiana's compulsory med-mal
arbitration law, the District Court for the District of Indiana ruled that a
claimant had no "fundamental right" to pursue a med-mal claim, and thus
whatever procedural burdens the state implemented did not violate due
process. 320 This holding is in line with state court cases, which tend to
314. See Redish, supra note 35, at 793 ("A legislature troubled by the jury trial argument
could follow the lead of jurisdictions that refuse to admit the panel's findings into evidence
in a subsequent trial.").
315. See Golann, supra note 32, at 531. The Fifth Amendment requires that "[n]o person
shall be ...deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. Const.
amend. V.
316. See U.S. Const. amend. V.
317. Golann, supra note 32, at 535 (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333
(1976) and Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950),
respectively). However, since these pronouncements were in the context of government
decisions regarding public benefits, the level of due process necessary in private adjudication
is not clearly defined. See id. at 537 ("Although the Court has also applied due process
principles to private adjudication, it has not described the minimum standards for such
processes with any specificity."). In some cases, "where there is a greater need for speed
and economy of adjudication, expertise is important, and the dispute has less of an
adversarial character, the [C]ourt has been willing to curtail or abandon the adjudicatory
model altogether." Id. at 538 (describing why the court has rejected due process challenges
to alterations of the traditional adjudicatory model in family law and mental health decisionmaking contexts).
318. Id. at 540-41 (noting that "where a state provides a civil cause of action, due process
principles bar the state from imposing preconditions or barriers to a claimant's access to
adjudication, or obstacles to the conduct of the adjudicatory hearing itself, which are either
irrational or unreasonable in light of the goals they serve." (citing Logan v. Zimmerman
Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 428-30, 433, 437 (1982))).
319. See Golann, supra note 32, at 541 n.241 (analyzing the Supreme Court's
pronouncement that imposing preconditions on proceeding with litigation does not
automatically violate due process).
320. See Hines v. Elkhart Gen. Hosp., 465 F. Supp. 421, 433 (N.D. Ind. 1979) ("The
provisions of the Act assailed by the plaintiffs do not violate. .. the Indiana Constitution['s
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decide the issue similarly. 3 2 1 Due process challenges also sometimes rely
on the theory that a civil claim constitutes a property interest, and thus
governmental interference with filing of a claim is similar to an
uncompensated taking. 322 However, compulsory court-annexed med-mal
arbitration laws are never binding, 323 so litigants are never deprived
of their
324
due process "property" interests in filing med-mal lawsuits.
When examining the laws under a due process lens, federal courts have
not been troubled by laws employing the admissible approach-allowing
evidence of the arbitration record and results at trial. 32 5 While several state
courts find the admissible approach constitutionally impermissible on due
process grounds, 326 federal courts tend to be less willing to strike down a
327
state's compulsory med-mal arbitration law according to this rationale.
Federal courts also consider equal protection challenges to compulsory
court-annexed med-mal arbitration laws. 3 28 In addition to the Fourteenth
Amendment's guarantee that "[n]o state shall.., deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws," 329 the Supreme Court has

due process guarantee] nor do they violate the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.... [S]ince a claimant's right to pursue
litigation does not constitute a fundamental right, as clearly established by the case law cited
above, no real due process issue arises in consideration of such medical malpractice statutes
concerning the purported burdens placed upon claims by medical review panel
procedures.").
321. The court in Hines cited Prendergast v. Nelson, 256 N.W.2d 657, 663-64 (Neb.
1977) and Everett v. Goldman, 359 So. 2d 1256, 1268-69 (La. 1978), both of which rejected
due process challenges. Hines, 465 F. Supp. at 433.
322. See Logan, 455 U.S. at 434; Colton v. Riccobono, 496 N.E.2d 670, 672 (N.Y. 1986)
("Petitioner's claim of right rests solely on constitutional due process grounds; she claims
that she has a property interest in access to the courts and that application of the statute and
rule unfairly deprive her of that access."); see also Golann, supra note 32, at 532 n. 194.
323. See supra notes 232, 301 and accompanying text; see also Katz, supra note 5, at 25
("Under the Due Process Clause, mandatory arbitration is invalid only if the arbitral result is
final and binding and parties are deprived of any subsequent judicial hearing.").
324. Cf Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (outlining a three-pronged
balancing test for determining whether due process is afforded by governmental decisionmaking procedures). Although generally not applicable to nonbinding med-mal arbitration,
which operates in the context of private adjudication, the Mathews formula suggests that the
Court is willing to defer to the state's interest rather than providing heightened procedural
protections for individuals. When examining decisions involving liberty and property
interests
that are wholly adversary, the Court has imposed a high level of procedural
protection. By contrast, where there is a greater need for speed and economy of
adjudication, expertise is important, and the dispute has less of an adversarial
character, the Court has been willing to curtail or abandon the adjudicatory model
altogether.
Golann, supra note 32, at 538 (footnote omitted).
325. See, e.g., Davison v. Sinai Hosp. of Bait., Inc., 462 F. Supp. 778, 781 (D. Md. 1978),
affd per curiam, 617 F.2d 361, 362 (4th Cir. 1980) (finding no due process violation with
the provision of the Maryland law allowing admission of the arbitration result at trial).
326. See infra notes 412-14 and accompanying text.
327. See generally Golann, supra note 32, at 531-49.
328. See generally id. at 549-57.
329. U.S. Const. amend. XIV.
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ruled that the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause incorporates the
Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of equal protection of the laws, thus
330
litigants are afforded equal protection of the laws in federal courts.
However, according to the different standards of equal protection review
pronounced by the Court, 33 1 only classifications applying to "suspect"
groups or "fundamental" rights receive the most searching review: strict
scrutiny review. 332 In most other cases, including classifications involving
med-mal litigants, rational basis review is applied-"there must exist a
logical connection between the classification at issue and a legitimate
governmental goal. '333 Furthermore, under the rational basis standard of
review, "[s]tate legislatures are presumed to have acted within their
constitutional power despite the fact that, in practice, their laws result in
some inequality. A statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state
' 334
of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it."
Federal courts apply rational basis review when reviewing compulsory
med-mal arbitration laws because neither suspect classifications nor
fundamental rights are implicated. 335 Since rational basis review presumes
state legislation is constitutional as long as it is based on a legitimate
governmental goal, courts are likely to defer to legislative findings that
compulsory med-mal arbitration improves states' medical systems. 336 For
example, the Fifth Circuit found that
330. See Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954); see also Golann, supra note 32, at
549 n.276.
331. See generally Patrick J. Norton, Comment, Is Equality Foundation the Latest
Chapter in America's Culture War?, 48 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 903, 905-07 (1998)
(describing the three main standards of equal protection review: rational basis, intermediate
scrutiny, and strict scrutiny).
332. See Golann, supra note 32, at 550.
333. Id. The rational basis standard of equal protection review has also been phrased as
asking whether
the statutory classification has some rational basis in fact and bears a rational
relationship to legitimate governmental objectives....
[Tihere are two separate and distinct prongs to the rational basis test. The first
prong of the test has been formulated as requiring that the classification is
reasonable, not arbitrary .... or that the statutory classification has some rational
basis in fact ....
The second prong requires either that the statutory
classification.., bear a rational relationship to legitimate state objectives, ... or
that it be reasonably related to a legitimate governmental interest.
R. George Wright, Low-Level Equal Protection: The Scope and Logic of Deferential
Review, 77 Ky. L.J. 117, 121 (1988) (footnote and internal quotation marks omitted).
334. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961).
335. See, e.g., Woods v. Holy Cross Hosp., 591 F.2d 1164, 1173 (5th Cir. 1979)
(describing the application of rational basis review and concluding that "[tjhe Florida
provisions at issue need not be evaluated under the strict scrutiny standard, as neither a
suspect class nor a fundamental right is involved in the classifications"); Seoane v. Ortho
Pharm., Inc., 472 F. Supp. 468, 471-72 (E.D. La. 1979) (comparing Louisiana's statute with
the statute scrutinized in Woods and similarly applying rational basis review).
336. Woods, 591 F.2d at 1174 (approving of the Florida legislature's justifications for
passing a compulsory court-annexed med-mal arbitration law); see also Gronne v. Abrams,
793 F.2d 74, 77-78 (2d Cir. 1986); DiFilippo v. Beck, 520 F. Supp. 1009, 1016 (D. Del.
1981).
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[o]ne significant factor causing the rising insurance rates was an increase
in malpractice litigation, and one way to reduce such litigation was to
screen out nonmeritorious claims through the use of [compulsory ADRI
panels. In addition, such panels could encourage the settlement of
meritorious claims, since after a panel found a malpractice defendant
negligent he would be encouraged to settle the dispute rather than proceed
which the panel finding would be introduced into evidence
to a trial in 337
against him.

While a state's alleged interest in discouraging med-mal litigation is
controversial, 338 federal courts have considered it legitimate. 3 39 Whether a
seems to have little
law follows the admissible or inadmissible approach 340
impact on equal protection challenges in federal courts.

2. State Cases Upholding Compulsory Med-Mal Arbitration Laws
State courts usually reject right to jury trial challenges to compulsory
court-annexed med-mal arbitration laws. 34 1 "The seventh amendment does
not apply to litigation in state courts, but, similar to the federal Constitution,
the constitutions of forty-eight states provide generally that the right to jury
trial shall be preserved inviolate." 342 State courts usually rule that a
legislature has a legitimate interest in passing a compulsory med-mal
arbitration law, and thus defer to the legislature's prerogatives. 34 3 In one of
the most widely cited state court cases rejecting a right to jury trial
337. Woods, 591 F.2d at 1174 (citations omitted).
338. Compare infra note 375, with infra note 418 and accompanying text.
339. See DiAntonio v. Northampton-Accomack Mem'l Hosp., 628 F.2d 287, 290 (4th
Cir. 1980) ("There was a legislative finding that the high cost of medical malpractice
insurance was beyond the means of some health care providers and that they were ceasing to
render services. It was thought that passage of the Act would lower the cost of medical
malpractice insurance, since the panel would weed out frivolous claims and would perform a
mediation function with respect to other claims. In consequence of the panel's performance
of these functions, it was believed that the amount of medical malpractice litigation would be
substantially reduced, thus substantially lowering the cost of medical malpractice
insurance."); Woods, 591 F.2d at 1174-75; see also Hines v. Elkhart Gen. Hosp., 465 F.
Supp. 421, 430-31 (N.D. Ind. 1979).
340. See, e.g., Woods, 591 F.2d at 1175 n. 17 (finding that the statute's provision allowing
admission of the ADR results as evidence at trial did not violate equal protection).
341. See, e.g., Eastin v. Broomfield, 570 P.2d 744, 750 (Ariz. 1977); Att'y Gen. v.
Johnson, 385 A.2d 57, 71 (Md. 1978); Paro v. Longwood Hosp., 369 N.E.2d 985 (Mass.
1977); Prendergast v. Nelson, 256 N.W.2d 657 (Neb. 1977); Comiskey v. Arlen, 390
N.Y.S.2d 122 (App. Div. 1976); State ex rel. Strykowski v. Wilkie, 261 N.W.2d 434 (Wis.
1978); see also Kristine Cordier Karnezis, Annotation, Validity and Construction of State
Statutory Provisions Relating to Limitations on Amount of Recovery in Medical Malpractice
Claim and Submission of Such Claim to PretrialPanel, 80 A.L.R.3d 583, § 9(a) (LEXIS
through 2007) (listing cases upholding compulsory med-mal ADR laws).
342. Golann, supra note 32, at 503 (footnote omitted).
343. See, e.g., Parker v. Children's Hosp. of Phila., 394 A.2d 932, 937 (Pa. 1978) ("[I]t
must be remembered that a legislative enactment enjoys a presumption in favor of its
constitutionality ....The legislature must be respected in its attempt to exercise the State's
police power and the power of judicial review must not be used as a means by which the
courts might substitute its [sic] judgment as to public policy for that of the legislature.").
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challenge, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court upheld Pennsylvania's
compulsory med-mal arbitration law, recognizing that a state had a
344
reasonable interest in passing the law:
With the ever increasing demand upon judicial time, one of the accepted
solutions in recent years has been the attempt to divert dispute-resolution,
where appropriate, to forums other than the court rooms. This trend has
been motivated by the realization that the traditional trial is not
necessarily the exclusive and only effective means by which the
345
disagreements that arise within our society may be resolved.

State courts have also relied on the reasonableness standard to declare
other state interests-such as "weeding out" frivolous claims, reducing
delay and court congestion, and even reducing excessive monetary jury
awards-as valid justifications for the laws. 346 For example, in Parker v.
Children's Hospital of Philadelphiathe Pennsylvania Supreme Court was
"satisfied that any theoretical burden upon the victim's right to trial by jury
is counterbalanced by the substantial advantages [to the state] provided" by
34 7
using compulsory med-mal arbitration.
Whether a state's law follows the admissible or inadmissible approach
34 8
can be determinative in right to jury trial challenges in state courts.

According to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, as long as admission of the
arbitration result does not "place[] that information in the status of a
presumption nor.., shift the burden of going forward with evidence or
change the burden of persuasion," the compulsory arbitration system does
not deprive parties of their right to jury trial. 34 9 In other words, state courts
are most concerned with ensuring that "[t]he jury remains the final arbiter
344. Parker,394 A.2d at 938.
345. Id.; see also Golann, supra note 32, at 519-20, 519 n.133 (footnote omitted).
346. See, e.g., Keyes v. Humana Hosp. of Alaska, Inc., 750 P.2d 343 (Alaska 1988);
Kranda v. Houser-Norborg Med. Corp., 419 N.E.2d 1024 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981); see also
Golann, supra note 32, at 5 19-20, 520 n. 134 (compiling a list of several state cases rejecting
right to jury trial challenges to compulsory med-mal ADR laws based on allegedly
reasonable state interests).
347. See, e.g., Parker,394 A.2d at 939 ("Appellants stress the difficulties encountered by
plaintiffs in these actions in securing and paying the expert witnesses necessary to establish
the case. Arbitration however, provides the flexibility that will permit an accommodation to
the schedules of these witnesses that could not be obtained in the traditional trial setting.
Thus arbitration not only facilitates the availability of these witnesses, it also tends to
decrease the cost of their appearance since these hearings eliminate much of the loss of time
associated with regular trials."). But see Mattos v. Thompson, 421 A.2d 190 (Pa. 1980)
(declaring Pennsylvania's compulsory med-mal arbitration law unconstitutional); infra notes
393-403 and accompanying text.
348. Compare Att'y Gen. v. Johnson, 385 A.2d 57, 67-68 (Md. 1978) (finding no rightto-jury-trial violation raised by the admissibility of the ADR panel's award at trial), with
Simon v. St. Elizabeth Med. Ctr., 355 N.E.2d 903, 908 (Ohio C.P. 1976) ("While the right to
proceed to a jury trial still exists under [the Ohio med-mal arbitration statute], it is clearly
not a free and unfettered right as was certainly intended by the framers of Article I, Section 5
of the Ohio Constitution. Therefore, the arbitration provisions under [the statute], which
permit the introduction into evidence and exposure to the jury of the arbitrator's decision, are
a violation of the right to trial by jury.").
349. Parker,394 A.2d at 941.
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of the issues raised and the facts presented. '3 50 Thus, the inadmissible
approach is more likely
to withstand constitutional scrutiny than the
35 1
admissible approach.
The admissible approach raises particularly relevant right to jury trial
concerns when the state's system allows the arbitration result to serve as
prima facie evidence of liability or allows admission of the arbitration result
to shift the burden of proof at trial. 352 In essence, the concern is that these
provisions put one of the litigating parties at a disadvantage, significantly
altering the traditional jury trial system. 353 Nevertheless, state courts have
rejected these concerns, providing state legislatures with substantial leeway
in assigning burdens of proof and rules of evidence. 354 Thus, right to jury
trial challenges to compulsory court-annexed med-mal arbitration laws tend
3 55
to fail in state courts.
Similarly, due process challenges in state courts turn on whether the
court accepts the state's justifications for passing its compulsory courtannexed med-mal arbitration law. 356 For example, the Indiana Supreme
350. Id.; see also Prendergast v. Nelson, 256 N.W.2d 657, 665 (Neb. 1977) ("The medical
review panel does not decide the case. It does provide evidence which may be considered by
the jury. The net effect of this provision is to furnish the parties with the opinion of an
expert panel. In this respect, it is no different from any other expert testimony received at a
trial. The jury still remains as the ultimate arbiter of all fact questions raised.").
Interestingly, Maryland courts are untroubled by Maryland's compulsory med-mal
arbitration law, which establishes a presumption of validity for the arbitration panel's
decision when introduced as evidence at trial. See Johnson, 385 A.2d at 69 ("That the
legislature may... pass rules affecting the burden of proof without infringing the right to
jury trial is not to be doubted, as is evident from both our own case law and decisions of the
Supreme Court of the United States."); see also Newell v. Richards, 594 A.2d 1152, 1160
(Md. 1991) ("If either the claimant or health care provider is unsuccessful at arbitration, the
award is admissible and will have evidentiary impact on the trier of fact. If the claimant is
unsuccessful at arbitration, the burden of proof was on the claimant before arbitration and
will be on the claimant after arbitration. Thus, as far as the burden of proof is concerned, the
unsuccessful claimant is in the same position as if arbitration had not occurred. On the other
hand, if the health care provider is unsuccessful at arbitration, in addition to the evidentiary
effect of the adverse award, the health care provider would be further penalized by a shifting
of the usual burden of proof as the result of the arbitration award.").
351. See infra notes 412-14 and accompanying text (describing cases in which state
courts struck down laws following the admissible approach); see also supra note 314 and
accompanying text.
352. See Golann, supra note 32, at 514-15.
353. Particularly unusual are compulsory arbitration systems following the admissibility
approach, but which do not allow cross-examination of the arbitration panel members at
trial. Such a system has been upheld as constitutional. See Keyes v. Humana Hosp. of?.
Alaska, Inc., 750 P.2d 343 (Alaska 1988). But see id. at 362 (Burke, J., dissenting) ("[A]
statute which injects influential, court-sponsored evidence into jury trials as a matter of
course, where the only real purpose in doing so is to influence the jury's verdict one way or
the other, intrudes upon the parties' basic right to be free from undue court interference in
the jury trial process.").
354. See, e.g., Keyes, 750 P.2d at 343, 349; Johnson, 385 A.2d at 67-68 (Md. 1978); see
also Golann, supra note 32, at 515 (discussing Keyes andJohnson).
355. But see infra notes 393-403 and accompanying text.
356. See Golann, supra note 32, at 546 ("State courts have often framed the question as
whether the challenged scheme has a reasonable or rational relationship to a legitimate
legislative goal, usually the resolution of a crisis in affordable malpractice insurance and
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Court upheld an Indiana law over a due process challenge because the law
addressed the state's interest of limiting the number of malpractice suits,
which, the court decided, contributed to the high cost and unavailability of
liability insurance. 357 As the New York Court of Appeals explained when
upholding New York's compulsory med-mal arbitration statute, 3 58
[The statute] was one of a series of legislative responses to rising
medical malpractice insurance rates. It was seen as a means of better
equipping litigants to mediate a settlement, if warranted, or to prepare and
narrow the issues for trial, if trial was required, thereby reducing the cost
of litigation and helping preserve quality health care in this State. Since
the legislation bears a rational relationship to that need, it does not violate
359
substantive due process concerns.
Most states employ a similar analysis in rejecting due process challenges to
360
the laws.
In due process challenges, whether a law follows the admissible or
inadmissible approach usually does not have a significant impact. "For the
same reasons that the [admission of the arbitration results at trial] does not
violate the right to jury trial, it is even less likely to offend the more flexible
standards of due process."' 36 1 However, due process challenges focus more
attention on the arbitration procedures themselves than do right to jury trial
challenges, and some courts are troubled by the evidentiary implications of
the admissibility approach. 362 The due process issue sometimes turns on

medical care, and have found that it does."); see also Carter v. Sparkman, 335 So. 2d 802,
805 (Fla. 1976); Jones v. State Bd. of Med., 555 P.2d 399, 407 (Idaho 1976); Johnson, 385
A.2d at 60-62; Prendergast v. Nelson, 256 N.W.2d 657, 663-65 (Neb. 1977); Parker v.
Children's Hosp. of Phila., 394 A.2d 932, 939 (Pa. 1978); State ex rel. Strykowski v. Wilkie,
261 N.W.2d 434, 449 (Wis. 1978).
357. Johnson v. St. Vincent Hosp., 404 N.E.2d 585, 594 (Ind. 1980) ("The Legislature
was undoubtedly moved because of its appraisal that the services of health care providers
were being threatened and curtailed contrary to the health interests of the community
because of the high cost and unavailability of liability insurance.
This cost and
unavailability was in turn in part the product of an increase in the number of malpractice
claims and large judgments and settlements in connection with them, and that they were in
turn in part the result of the fact that medical opinion, as free from influence and prejudice as
possible under the circumstances, was not readily available to the parties and to the courts.
The requirement of the statute that malpractice claims be first submitted to a medical panel
for evaluation is one reasonable means of dealing with the threatened loss to the community
of health care services in this situation.").
358. Note, however, that New York's compulsory court-annexed med-mal arbitration
statute has since been repealed. See Jud. Ct. Acts Law § 148-a (McKinney, LEXIS through
Feb. 14, 2007 Sess.) (describing the reason for repeal of New York's compulsory med-mal
arbitration statute in the notes and annotations section).
359. Colton v. Riccobono, 496 N.E.2d 670, 673-74 (N.Y. 1986).
360. See, e.g., Keyes v. Humana Hosp. of Alaska, Inc., 750 P.2d 343, 353 (Alaska 1988);
Halpern v. Gozan, 381 N.Y.S.2d 744, 745-47 (Sup. Ct. 1976) (outlining extensively the New
York legislature's justifications for enacting the compulsory med-mal ADR statute); see also
Karnezis, supra note 341, § 11(a) (providing a list of state cases rejecting due process
challenges to compulsory med-mal ADR statutes).
361. Golann, supra note 32, at 545 (footnote omitted).
362. The New York Supreme Court framed the issue well:
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the technical differences among laws following the admissible approachfor example, whether or not cross-examination of the arbitrators is allowed
after admission of arbitration evidence. 36 3 Admission of arbitration
evidence likely will not run afoul of due process as long as sufficient jury
364
instructions are provided regarding the evidence's probative value.
Equal protection challenges, on the other hand, focus on how med-mal
litigants are classified, rather than on the technical arbitration procedures
employed. 365 State courts generally follow the rationale used by federal
courts, which reject equal protection challenges to compulsory courtannexed med-mal arbitration using rational basis review. 36 6 For example,
the Supreme Court of Colorado considered med-mal litigants not to be a
suspect class and applied rational basis review to an equal protection
challenge. 367 The court recognized that "[a]rbitration is favored by the law
in Colorado" and ruled that "[b]y expediting the adversary process,
arbitration promotes quicker settlement of cases thereby speeding up access
to the courts and decreasing the costs to the parties," both of which it
368
deemed to be legitimate state interests.
Would not the impact of the recommendation be so overpowering as to remove de
facto the essential elements of fairness and open-mindedness which are so crucial
to the total fabric of our jury system, thereby infecting it with prejudicial taint?
The response to both questions remains the same. For if the trial court instructs the
jury with clarity and simplicity, their true roles as the exclusive finders of fact will
prevail. That the recommendation shall not be binding upon the jury... but shall
be accorded such weight as the jury ...chooses to ascribe to it. With the proper
instructions by the court, there could be no constitutional infirmity to contaminate
the purity of the jurors' prerogatives.
Halpern, 381 N.Y.S.2d at 748 (internal quotation marks omitted). However, Katz suggests
that ADR procedures may not be appropriate evidence to submit to juries:
Rules on use at a later trial of testimony or information gained at an ADR
proceeding sometimes raise due process concerns. Statutes allowing an arbitrator
or mediator opinion to be introduced into evidence at a later trial have been upheld
if there is an opportunity to cross examine the opinions' author. However,
disclosure and cross examination conflict with the strong policy of confidentiality
in ADR, particularly in procedures such as mediation or summary jury trials ....
Disclosure of a result in such a case without opportunity for cross examination
would arguably be a denial of due process.
See Katz, supra note 5, at 26 (footnote omitted); see also infra Part II.B.2 (examining state
cases that reject laws following the admissible approach on due process grounds).
363. See Keyes, 750 P.2d at 352-54; Eastin v. Broomfield, 570 P.2d 744, 748-49 (Ariz.
1977); McLean v. Hunter, 486 So. 2d 816, 819 (La. Ct. App. 1986); see also Golann, supra
note 32, at 545 (suggesting that "[t]here is little reason to believe that the admission of
dispute resolution results or the testimony of ADR neutrals at trial violates the due process
clause, as long as cross-examination is provided").
364. See supra note 362 (discussing the importance of adequately instructing a jury on
how it may use the compulsory arbitration record evidence); see also Golann, supra note 32,
at 546-49 (discussing due process implications of admitting compulsory arbitration evidence
at a subsequent trial).
365. See id. at 555 n.305 (describing state cases examining the equal protection issue).
366. See supra notes 328-40 and accompanying text.
367. Firelock, Inc. v. Dist. Court. of 20th Judicial Dist., 776 P.2d 1090, 1098 (Colo.
1989).
368. Id. at 1099.
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One recurring issue is whether equal protection is afforded by laws
treating med-mal plaintiffs differently than defendants. 369 The Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts examined the issue when it considered
Massachusetts's statute, which had different procedural requirements for
plaintiffs and defendants while participating in compulsory med-mal
arbitration. 370 The Court explained, "Discrimination between plaintiffs and
defendants is not per se unconstitutional; such classifications must merely
satisfy the general rationality standard to survive. The Legislature could
reasonably have determined that the bulk of frivolous malpractice litigation
resulted from plaintiffs who filed and prosecuted suits without having a
legally sufficient claim." 37 1 Considering the troubled state of medicine in
the late twentieth century and the insurance crises affecting doctors, 372 state
courts are generally untroubled by compulsory med-mal arbitration
procedures that favor doctor-defendants. 373
Additionally, state courts tend to reject challenges to compulsory courtannexed med-mal arbitration laws based on the complaint that med-mal
litigants are treated differently than all other civil litigants. 374 Under
rational basis review, classifications treating litigants differently are
presumed valid as long as they are rationally related to a legitimate
governmental interest. In med-mal cases, the state's interest is screening
and ultimately discouraging med-mal lawsuits. 375 Not surprisingly, state
courts, which are theoretically more in tune with state politics, consider
these state interests to be legitimate, primarily based on the perceived
implications of the med-mal crises of the late twentieth century. 376 Most
states agree 377 and reject equal protection challenges to compulsory courtannexed med-mal arbitration laws, despite the unequal treatment of med3 78
mal litigants the laws call for.
369. See Golann, supra note 32, at 552.
370. Paro v. Longwood Hosp., 369 N.E.2d 985, 989 (Mass. 1977).
371. Id. at 989 (citation omitted).
372. See supra Part I.B.2.
373. Paro,369 N.E.2d at 989; see also Golann, supra note 32, at 552 & n.288.
374. In fact, it has been pointed out that compulsory court-annexed med-mal arbitration
laws create other classifications. For a useful summary of these classifications, see Woods v.
Holy Cross Hospital, 591 F.2d 1164, 1173 n.15 (5th Cir. 1979).
375. See supra note 339 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 417-19 and
accompanying text.
376. See, e.g., Prendergast v. Nelson, 256 N.W.2d 657, 668-69 (Neb. 1977) ("The
classification does have a reasonable basis. The Legislature acted to meet a crisis
situation .... We are dealing with the fundamental right to adequate medical care. To
provide this type of care, the Legislature has found it necessary to try to eliminate
nonmeritorious malpractice claims and to limit the amount of the recovery in those claims
found to have merit. To attempt to meet a crisis, the Legislature is free to experiment and to
innovate and to do so at will, or even 'at the whim."' (quoting Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113,
134 (1876)).
377. However, not all states accept the med-mal crises as warranting legislative
interference with the traditional med-mal cause of action. See Boucher v. Sayeed, 459 A.2d
87, 91-93 (R.I. 1983); see also infra notes 417-19 and accompanying text.
378. See Woods, 591 F.2d at 1170 n. 11 (listing state cases that rejected equal protection
challenges); see also Karnezis, supra note 341, § 11(a) (listing cases from Arizona,
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Finally, state courts tend to reject otherwise uncommon constitutional
challenges to compulsory med-mal ADR laws. For example, the Supreme
Court of Guam, located in a U.S. territory, declined to declare Guam's
compulsory med-mal arbitration statute unconstitutional3 79 based on
separation of powers concerns. 380 State courts usually find that
there is no usurpation of judicial authority here because not only are the
petitioners afforded a judicial review of the determination of the panel,
they are entitled to a trial de novo in a court.... [Courts have] often held

that quasi-judicial authority may constitutionally
be delegated to
38 1
commissions and administrative agencies.
Several other state courts have rejected similar charges-loosely grouped as
separation of powers concerns. 382 In any event, whether on right to jury
trial, due process, equal protection, or even unique state constitutional
challenges like separation of powers concerns, compulsory court-annexed
med-mal arbitration laws are generally upheld in state courts.
B. Compulsory Court-Annexed Med-Mal ArbitrationIs Unconstitutional
Part II.B. 1 examines federal cases that have declared compulsory courtannexed med-mal arbitration laws unconstitutional. Part II.B.2 examines
state cases that have held similarly.
1. Federal Cases Rejecting Compulsory Med-Mal Arbitration Laws
Few federal courts have sustained constitutional challenges to
compulsory med-mal arbitration laws. Those that have did so on right to
jury trial grounds. For example, the Ninth Circuit affirmed a district court
ruling considering Guam's compulsory med-mal arbitration statute to be
383
inconsistent with the statute's express provision for a right to jury trial.
384
Although this decision was rooted in statutory construction rationale,
the

Delaware, Florida, Indiana, Louisina, Maine, Massachusetts, Montana, Nebraska, New
Jersey, New York, Ohio, and Wisconsin).
379. The Guam equivalent of constitutional is "organic." According to the Supreme
Court of Guam, "[t]he Organic Act serves the function of a constitution for Guam.... Until
Guam creates its own Constitution, the Organic Act of Guam is the equivalent of Guam's
Constitution." Villagomez-Palisson v. Superior Court, 2004 Guam 13 10 (citations and
internal quotation marks omitted).
380. Id.
17-18.
381. State ex rel. Strykowski v. Wilkie, 261 N.W.2d 434, 448 (Wis. 1978).
382. See Golann, supra note 32, at 529-31 (describing state constitutional separation of
powers provisions); see also Strykowski, 261 N.W.2d at 448-49 (rejecting the claim that
Wisconsin's compulsory med-mal review panel statute was an impermissible delegation of
judicial authority).
383. Awa v. Guam Mem'l Hosp. Auth., 726 F.2d 594, 596 (9th Cir. 1984) ("The Act is
inconsistent and unintelligible because it requires mandatory screening and arbitration while
it preserves the statutory right to a jury trial. We cannot apply such inconsistent
provisions.").
384. The court construed the statute so as not "to make mere surplusage of any statutory
provision." Awa, 726 F.2d at 597 (citing United States v. Marubeni Am. Corp., 611 F.2d
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court considered compulsory med-mal arbitration procedures to be
irreconcilable with the right to jury trial because "any party dissatisfied with
the result could relitigate all of the issues before a jury. The settling of
malpractice claims would then become more costly and less efficient, which
385
is contrary to the Guam legislature's interest in 'optimum efficiency.'
Although Guam's quasi-constitutional structure is unique, likely causing
this opinion to have little influence in other jurisdictions, the Ninth Circuit's
concern with "optimum efficiency" is noteworthy; state courts have seized
on this concern and examined386it in relation to the compulsory nature of
med-mal arbitration processes.
Interestingly, the United States District Court for the District of Kansas
considered med-mal claimants to constitute a class deserving heightened
scrutiny review under the Equal Protection Clause. 387 The court concluded
that "[m]edical malpractice victims generally have no control over the
inception of their afflictions or illnesses and even less choice concerning the
medical mis-, mal-, or nonfeasance practiced on them. Moreover, victims
of medical malpractice are relegated to a position of political
powerlessness ...-"388 Thus, the court concluded, "the classifications
involved in this case are sensitive, and. .. the rights at issue are sufficiently
important to require that the restrictions on those rights be subjected to'389a
more exacting form of scrutiny than the mere rational basis test."
Although aberrational, 390 the court's reasoning suggests that rational basis
review may not be the automatic standard that should be applied in equal
protection challenges to compulsory court-annexed med-mal arbitration
laws.
Finally, it is noteworthy that federal courts refuse to enforce a
compulsory court-annexed med-mal arbitration law when a state's highest
763, 767 (9th Cir. 1980); Pettis ex rel. United States v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 577 F.2d
668, 673 (9th Cir. 1978)).
385. Id. at 597.
386. See, e.g., infra note 403 and accompanying text.
387. Coburn v. Agustin, 627 F. Supp. 983, 995 (D. Kan. 1985).
388. Id. at 994.
389. Id. at 995. In this case, the court declared Kansas's statute abolishing the collateral
source rule for successful med-mal claimants unconstitutional on equal protection grounds.
The court applied "heightened scrutiny" because of the vulnerability of med-mal claimants
and the importance of the collateral source rule-individuals' ability to obtain full recovery
for their injuries. Whether the court would have applied heightened scrutiny under an equal
protection challenge to Kansas's compulsory med-mal ADR statute is unclear. Nevertheless,
the court remained skeptical of such legislation:
[E]xtending of special litigation benefits to the medical profession will do little to
protect the public health. "On the contrary, the quality of health care may actually
decline. To the extent that in tort actions of the malpractice type if the medical
profession is less accountable than formerly, relaxation of medical standards may
occur with the public the victim."
Id. (quoting Graley v. Satayatham, 343 N.E.2d 832, 838 (Ohio C.P. 1976)). Additionally,
the court recognized that "the propaganda campaign mounted to obtain the [medical
malpractice] legislation was overstated." Id. at 996.
390. Most federal and state courts apply the rational basis standard of review in equal
protection challenges. See supra notes 333, 366 and accompanying text.
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court has declared it unconstitutional. 39 1 Federal courts' reluctance to
declare states' compulsory court-annexed med-mal arbitration laws
unconstitutional 392 suggests that challengers should focus their efforts in
state courts.
2. State Cases Rejecting Compulsory Med-Mal Arbitration Laws
State courts sometimes declare compulsory court-annexed med-mal
393
arbitration laws unconstitutional on right to jury trial grounds.
Employing the reasonableness standard, 394 state courts rule that a law
violates a plaintiffs right to jury trial when the law unreasonably burdens
that right. 395 For example, in Wright v. Central Du Page Hospital
Association, the Supreme Court of Illinois ruled that Illinois's compulsory
med-mal arbitration law violated a plaintiff's state right to jury trial because
the delegation of judicial decision-making functions to a court-annexed
panel caused the right to jury trial not to remain "inviolate," as required by
the Illinois constitution. 396 Interestingly, some courts analyze the state's
justification for passing a compulsory med-mal arbitration law when
considering whether the law unreasonably burdens plaintiffs' right to jury
trial. 397
Courts have rejected "weeding out" frivolous claims and
improving court backlogs as possible justifications for compulsory med-mal

391. See, e.g., Firich v. Am. Cystoscope Makers, Inc., 635 F.2d 259, 260-61 (3d Cir.
1980).
392. See supra Part II.A. 1.
393. See, e.g., Keyes v. Humana Hosp. of Alaska, Inc., 750 P.2d 343, 360-61 (Alaska
1988) (Burke, J., dissenting) (describing provisions allowing admissibility of ADR results
without the opportunity to cross-examine the ADR panel members at trial as violating the
state right to jury trial); Wright v. Cent. Du Page Hosp. Ass'n, 347 N.E.2d 736, 741 (I11.
1976) (striking down Illinois' compulsory arbitration system on right to jury trial grounds);
Mattos v. Thompson, 421 A.2d 190, 195 (Pa. 1980) (finding a Pennsylvania compulsory
med-mal ADR statute to violate the petitioner's state right to jury trial because the
procedures imposed unreasonable delay and barriers which practically denied the right
altogether); see also Karnezis, supra note 341, § 10(b) (listing state cases declaring
compulsory med-mal ADR laws unconstitutional on right to jury trial grounds).
394. See supra notes 306-07 and accompanying text.
395. See, e.g., Mattos, 421 A.2d at 195 ("[T]he lengthy delay occasioned by the
arbitration system therein does in fact burden the right of a jury trial with 'onerous
conditions, restrictions or regulations which ... make the right practically unavailable.' Nor
can we agree that the actual operation of the Act's arbitration 'procedure is reasonably
designed to effectuate the desired objective' of affording 'the plaintiff a swifter adjudication
of his claim, at a minimal cost."' (quoting Parker v. Children's Hosp. of Phila., 394 A.2d
932, 939 (Pa. 1978); Application of Smith, 112 A.2d 625, 629 (Pa. 1955))).
396. See Wright, 347 N.E.2d at 739-41 (examining Illinois' separation of powers issues
together with Illinois' right to jury trial issues, and concluding that "[b]ecause we have held
that these statutes providing for medical review panels are unconstitutional [on separation of
powers grounds], it follows that the procedure prescribed therein as the prerequisite to jury
trial is an impermissible restriction on the right of trial by jury guaranteed by ... the Illinois
Constitution").
397. See Golann, supra note 32, at 515-21.
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arbitration. 39 8 As one commentator noted, "This kind of social justification
for ADR-a need for change in the monetary result of adjudication-is
troubling under the Seventh Amendment ...[and] should not be used to
39 9
justify changes in the substantive results of the jury system."
Particularly helpful in right to jury trial challenges is statistical evidence
showing that claimants face unreasonable litigation delays or costs under
the compulsory arbitration law. For example, in Parker v. Children's
Hospital of Philadelphia,400 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court upheld
Pennsylvania's compulsory med-mal arbitration law, but noted the
existence of "statistics which would indicate that the present performance of
[the compulsory arbitration] procedure has been far from impressive in
demonstrating its capacity to provide an expeditious disposition of these
cases." 40 1 Three years later, in Mattos v. Thompson, the court relied on
more fully developed statistics, which portrayed "the failure of the [law] to
provide an efficacious alternative dispute-resolution procedure," when it
struck down the law as a violation of Pennsylvania's guaranteed right to
jury trial. 40 2 Since "[s]uch [unreasonable] delays are unconscionable and
irreparably rip the fabric of public confidence in the efficiency and
effectiveness of our judicial system," the court sustained the right to jury
403
trial challenge.
Other state courts declare compulsory med-mal ADR laws
unconstitutional on due process grounds. 404 The main due process concern
"is that engaging in [arbitration] can impose such serious burdens of delay,
expense, and stress on disputants as to constitute an unreasonable burden on
access to adjudication. '40 5 In most cases when a due process challenge is
successful, the law is declared to be valid in theory, but unconstitutional in
398. See, e.g., Wright, 347 N.E.2d at 739-40 (rejecting the argument, raised in amici
briefs, that the Illinois law was a reasonable response to the perceived med-mal insurance
crises).
399. Golann, supra note 32, at 520 n.135 (noting also that "[a]nother disadvantage of the
...reasonableness standard is that it requires a court to assess the importance of various
social goals at a particular point in time, weighing them against the very different values
inherent in the right to trial by jury").
400. 394 A.2d 932.

401. Id. at 940.
402. Mattos v. Thompson, 421 A.2d 190, 194 (Pa. 1980).

403. Id. at 195. But see id. at 198-99 (Roberts, J., dissenting) (considering a recent
legislative adjustment to the statute, allowing for expedited procedures and referral back to
court after delayed arbitration, to alleviate the statute's constitutional problems).
Interestingly, the Third Circuit noted, in dicta, that Pennsylvania's compulsory med-mal
system was "woefully" inadequate and analyzed claim statistics from the program over a
three-year period. See Edelson v. Soricelli, 610 F.2d 131, 135-36 (3d Cir. 1979).
404. See Aldana v. Holub, 381 So. 2d 231, 238 (Fla. 1980) (finding the Florida statute to

be an unconstitutional violation of due process because it "has proven [to be] arbitrary and
capricious in operation"); State ex reL Cardinal Glennon Mem'l Hosp. for Children v.
Gaertner, 583 S.W.2d 107, 110 (Mo. 1979) (en banc) (striking down a Missouri compulsory
court-annexed med-mal ADR law on access to court grounds); Jiron v. Mahlab, 659 P.2d
311, 313-14 (N.M. 1983) (finding an as-applied due process violation because plaintiffs
were denied their access to court under the New Mexico statute).
405. Golann, supra note 32, at 541.
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its application. 40 6 For example, in Aldana v. Holub,40 7 the Supreme Court
of Florida found that "although the parties were not barred from court,"
because they often had to wait over ten months to participate in the
compulsory arbitration, "they were prevented, on what the [lower] court
called an 'arbitrary and capricious' basis, from obtaining the benefits of
8

ADR.'

40

Some state courts sustain due process challenges because compulsory
med-mal arbitration laws impair plaintiffs' ability to secure personal
jurisdiction over alleged tortfeasors or necessary witnesses. 409
For
example, noting that "[t]he institution of the [New Mexico] Medical
Review Commission as a forum for screening medical malpractice claims
appears to work well in most instances," 4 10 the Supreme Court of New
Mexico nevertheless held that "where the requirement of first going before
the Medical Review Commission causes undue delay prejudicing a plaintiff
by the loss of witnesses or parties, the plaintiff is unconstitutionally
deprived of his right of access to the courts. ' ' 4 11 Similarly, state courts are
likely to strike down laws following the admissibility approach if
arbitration "requirements ... are so poorly designed or implemented as to
eliminate claims on a random or irrational basis [because such laws] offend
due process principles. '4 12 Although often not explicitly stated, courts
striking down laws following the admissible approach 4 13 likely recognize
the inherent procedural unfairness of using ADR merely to dissuade injured
4 14
patients from bringing lawsuits.
Finally, a few state courts, such as an Ohio court of common pleas in
Simon v. St. Elizabeth Medical Center, have looked favorably on equal
protection challenges to compulsory court-annexed med-mal arbitration
laws. 4 15 Most equal protection challenges are considered within the
rational basis review paradigm, thus turning on whether the court
406. See id. at 542; see also Wright v. Cent. Du Page Hosp. Ass'n, 347 N.E.2d 736, 741
(Ill. 1976) (declaring Illinois' statute unconstitutional, but also noting that "we do not imply
that a valid pretrial panel procedure cannot be devised").
407. 381 So. 2d at 231.
408. Golann, supra note 32, at 543 (quoting Aldana, 381 So. 2d at 235).
409. See Jiron, 659 P.2d at 313; State ex rel. Cardinal Glennon Mem'i Hosp. for
Children, 583 S.W.2d at 110 ("[D]elay, by abridging the right to file suit and have summons
issued promptly, necessarily destroyed the remedies which depended on obtaining personal
service on defendants.").
410. Jiron, 659 P.2d at 312.
411. Id. at 313. The court considered the right of access to the courts to be an integral
component of the constitutional guarantee of due process. Id. at 312 ("The right of access to
the courts is one aspect of the right to petition. A person should not be deprived of the right
of access to the courts without due process of law." (citation omitted)).
412. Golann, supra note 32, at 549. Golann notes that laws "authorizing admission of the
outcome of a process at trial, but barring cross-examination of the ADR neutral, also pose
serious due process issues." Id.
413. See, e.g., Simon v. St. Elizabeth Med. Ctr., 355 N.E.2d 903, 908-09 (Ohio C.P.
1976).
414. See supra note 362.
415. See, e.g., Simon, 355 N.E.2d at 908; Boucher v. Sayeed, 459 A.2d 87, 88 (R.I. 1983);
Hoem v. State, 756 P.2d 780, 783-84 (Wyo. 1988).
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recognizes a legitimate state interest in making med-mal classifications. 4 16
While federal and state courts often recognize a state's interest in
discouraging med-mal lawsuits, 4 17 not all courts recognize the interest as
"legitimate" for equal protection review purposes. 4 18 In perhaps the most
explicit rejection of a state's interest in reducing med-mal lawsuits, a state
court in Ohio suggested,
There obviously is no compelling governmental interest unless it be
argued that any segment of the public in financial distress be at least
partly relieved of financial accountability for its negligence. To articulate
the requirement is to demonstrate its absurdity, for at one time or another
every type of profession or business undergoes difficult times, and it is
not the business of government to manipulate the law so as to provide
succor to one class, the medical, by depriving another, the malpracticed
4 19
patients, of the equal protection mandated by the constitution.
Interestingly, the Ohio Court of Common Pleas recognized that its
decision could be characterized as judicial overreaching and thus
420
emphasized that its decision was grounded in constitutional reasoning.
Some state courts, such as the Rhode Island Supreme Court in Boucher v.
Sayeed, reject the theory that a med-mal crisis exists at all and thus require
evidence showing that the state's compulsory med-mal arbitration law is in
fact necessary. 42 1 In any event, whether or not a state court recognizes the
existence of a med-mal crisis, 422 the argument that reducing med-mal
423
lawsuits is not a legitimate state interest has sometimes been successful.
Furthermore, even assuming that a court recognizes the existence of a
med-mal crisis and that regulating med-mal lawsuits is a legitimate state
interest, a state's compulsory med-mal arbitration system must be rationally
related to that interest.4 24 At least one court has ruled that compulsory
416. See supra notes 333, 366 and accompanying text.
417. See supra notes 339, 368 and accompanying text.
418. See, e.g., Boucher, 459 A.2d at 91 (declaring Rhode Island's compulsory med-mal
arbitration law unconstitutional on equal protection grounds).
419. Simon, 355 N.E.2d at 911 (internal quotation marks omitted).
420. Id. ("Courts, of course, may not invalidate legislation merely because it is perceived
as unwise. Here there is a transgression of a basic constitutional principle forbidding
unequal and special treatment for a class with no general beneficient [sic] reason apparent."
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
421. See, e.g., Boucher, 459 A.2d at 93 (recognizing that med-mal crises have, in the past,
existed, but holding that "[a]bsent a crisis [at the time the legislation was passed] to justify
the enactment of such legislation, we can ascertain no satisfactory reason for the separate
and unequal treatment that it imposes on medical malpractice litigants"); Hoem v. State, 756
P.2d 780, 783 (Wyo. 1988) ("[W]e note the absence in the record of any evidence
demonstrating the existence of such a crisis in Wyoming or elsewhere. More importantly,
we note the absence in the record of any evidence that the 'crisis,' if in fact it exists, is in any
way connected with medical malpractice claims.").
422. Compare Simon, 355 N.E.2d at 911-12 (declaring the state's interest illegitimate
despite its recognition that a med-mal crisis existed), with Boucher, 459 A.2d at 92-93
(declaring the state's interest illegitimate because it considered no med-mal crises to have
existed at the time the law was passed).
423. See Katz, supra note 5, at 27.
424. See, e.g., Hoem, 756 P.2d at 783. The Wyoming Supreme Court explained,
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court-annexed med-mal arbitration is not rationally related to a legitimate
state interest; the Wyoming Supreme Court explained,
We cannot condone the legislature's use of the law to protect one class of
people from financial difficulties while it dilutes the rights under the
constitution of another class of people. Every profession confronts
financial distress at some time, and that does not justify
depriving others
42 5
of the equal protection guaranteed by the constitution.

While the court recognized that its reasoning is not followed in most
states, 426 its decision reflects the fact that absolute deference to legislative
4 27
purpose is not necessary, even when using rational basis review.
Interestingly, it has even been suggested that the inadmissible approach is
unconstitutional despite a legislature's finding that it was necessary; one
judge thought that a compulsory arbitration process that is nonbinding is
428
inherently wasteful and an impermissible burden on med-mal claimants.

Assuming, however, for the purposes of this opinion, that an insurance crisis
does exist in Wyoming and that it is related to medical malpractice litigation, we
must determine whether the legislation enacted is rationally related to its stated
purpose. There is no question that the legislature has a legitimate interest in
protecting the health of the citizens of Wyoming as well as the economic and
social stability of the state. The question is whether the legislation at issue
constitutes a reasonable and effective means of doing so. We maintain that it does
not. It cannot seriously be contended that the extension of special benefits to the
medical profession and the imposition of an additional hurdle in the path of
medical malpractice victims relate to the protection of the public health.
Id.
425. Id. at 784.
426. Id. ("In holding as we do that the act denies equal protection of the law in violation
of the constitution, we are cognizant that the majority of states have upheld similar
provisions.").
427. Perhaps Hoem can be explained by the fact that the court did not apply the
traditional rational basis standard of equal protection review. Id. at 782 (outlining applicable
equal protection standards in Wyoming without mentioning the rational basis review
doctrine). In any event, there appears to be room for a low level of deference to legislative
purpose, even within the traditional rational basis review paradigm. See Wright, supra note
333, at 117-18 ("Arguably, some divergence in the precise verbal formulation of an
essentially uniform 'low-level scrutiny' test is inevitable, and no great significance should be
attributed to minor terminological differences. In practice, however, the diversity among
ostensibly 'low-level scrutiny' formulations leads to great diversity in the degree of judicial
deference accorded to the legislative classification, and to great diversity of result on the
equal protection challenge itself.").
428. See, e.g., Hoem, 756 P.2d at 784 (Thomas, J., concurring). Judge Richard Thomas
explained,
The Wyoming Medical Review Panel Act serves only as an impediment to
pursuing a claim for medical malpractice, providing no recourse to anyone. The
ultimate product, which is not binding on any participant, is a decision reached in a
proceeding, which is to be held in confidence. The process delays, for a minimum
of 120 days, the right of the claimant to file a civil action, and there is no limit
upon the period to which the proceeding may be extended for good cause.
It almost seems that the Medical Review Panel Act process becomes an end in
itself.... Legislation that apparently furthers only an academic interest does not
serve to accomplish any goal, never mind a legitimate state interest.
Id. at 785.
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Cases declaring compulsory court-annexed med-mal arbitration laws
unconstitutional are uncommon. 429 Nevertheless, the argument that
compulsory med-mal arbitration violates the constitutional guarantees of a
jury trial, due process, and equal protection of the laws has been successful
in some state courts. 430 Particularly helpful in challenges to compulsory
court-annexed med-mal arbitration is evidence, in the form of studies and
statistics, showing that the compulsory arbitration system caused excessive
delays 4 3 1 or significantly altered the trial by jury system.43 2 In light of the
dubious link between med-mal lawsuits and the modem med-mal insurance
crises, 433 not to mention studies showing that the deleterious effects of the
modem med-mal insurance crises have stabilized, 434 the state interest in
continuing to administer compulsory court-annexed med-mal arbitration is
vulnerable to challenge.
III. COMPULSORY COURT-ANNEXED MED-MAL ARBITRATION LAWS
SHOULD BE DECLARED UNCONSTITUTIONAL OR REPEALED

A. Compulsory Court-Annexed Med-Mal ArbitrationImposes Significant
Risks of UnreasonablyBurdening Claimants' Rights to Jury Trial and Due
Process
The Mattos and Wright cases reflect appropriate treatment of right to jury
trial complaints. 4 35 Compulsory court-annexed med-mal arbitration laws
should be struck down because it is unreasonable to make litigants jump
through onerous procedural hoops before being afforded their right to jury
trial. In Mattos and Wright, it was particularly notable that the arbitration
process was not administered efficiently, thus causing claims to be kept
from the jury for unreasonably long periods. 436 Each state with a
compulsory med-mal arbitration system should monitor the time it takes
parties to go through the process. If a state's system produces excessive
delays, 437 litigants should emphasize such evidence when contesting
compulsory court-annexed med-mal arbitration laws on right to jury trial
grounds.
The fact that the arbitration process is nonbinding helps alleviate right to
jury trial concerns, but is not determinative for due process considerations.
429.
430.
431.
432.
433.
434.

Comparesupra Part II.A, with supra Part II.B.
See supra Part II.B.
See supra note 402 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 363-64.
See supra notes 20, 188-92 and accompanying text.
See generally Marc A. Rodwin et al., Malpractice Premiums and Physicians'

Income: Perceptions of a Crisis Conflict with Empirical Evidence, 25 Health Affairs 750

(2006).
435. See generally supra Part II.B.2.

436. See supra note 395 and accompanying text.
437. See, e.g., Sakayan, supra note 216, at 687-88 (suggesting that "screening panels are
a failure" at insuring prompt resolution of malpractice claims and offering data that shows
excessive delays exist in several states).
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Of course, arbitration has proven to be a productive alternative to litigation,
and few would argue that the process itself is inherently unfair. 438 Rather,
forcing parties to undergo two independent evaluations of a med-mal
dispute is wasteful and may lead to bad faith participation. For example,
unless fee shifting provisions apply, 439 there is no incentive for defendants
to reveal their best evidence or arguments during arbitration. 440 It is not
hard to imagine a compulsory arbitration panel, composed partly of
physicians and sympathetic attorneys, that elicits a full case from an injured
plaintiff, while allowing a physician defendant to rest on the presumption
that malpractice did not occur. 44 1 This scenario would weaken the
plaintiffs negotiating power, thereby encouraging the defendant to proceed
to trial based on the strategic advantage he gained from arbitration; such a
situation would actually lead to more med-mal litigation. Procedural due
process is violated when one party is forced to reveal its litigation strategy
to the other party before litigation has even begun.
Furthermore, the admissibility approach compromises the right to jury
trial and due process. Despite the argument that admission of an arbitration
result at trial does not change the jury's role as the final arbiter of factual
issues, 44 2 introduction of evidence that a party already arbitrated a med-mal
dispute and decided to proceed to litigation despite an unfavorable
arbitration ruling will likely prejudice a jury in favor of the non-losing
party. Since the arbitration proceedings are generally informal, and thus
evidence used in arbitration is not automatically admissible at trial, there
seems to be little reason for admitting the arbitration record at trial other
than to punish the losing party. Particularly troubling are laws that allow
admission of the arbitration record to shift burdens of proof and persuasion
at trial. 4 43 These laws are unreasonable and cannot be reconciled with state
constitutions that require jury trial to be retained as "inviolate." 4" Due
process is also violated by the admissible approach because introducing
evidence that a defendant was found not liable by a court-annexed
arbitration panel can be prejudicial, unreasonably impairing the quality of
4 45
the adjudicative process.

438. See generally supra Part L.A (describing the institutionalization of arbitration in the
U.S. civil justice system).
439. See supra note 278.
440. See Katz, supra note 5, at 33 ("'[T]he non-binding nature of [compulsory ADR]
presents great temptation to strategically withhold crucial evidence and argument."' (quoting
Hume v. M & C Mgmt., 129 F.R.D. 506, 508 (N.D. Ohio 1990))).
441. See generally Dauer & Becker, supra note 20, at 1:47-48 (discussing implications of
using attorneys or physicians as third-party neutrals).
442. See supra note 349 and accompanying text.
443. See supra note 350 and accompanying text.
444. See supra notes 342, 396 and accompanying text.
445. See supra note 318.
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B. Equal Protection ChallengesShould Be Considered
Equal protection challenges to compulsory court-annexed med-mal
arbitration laws have merit. While rational basis review is the correct
standard of review, 44 6 courts have been too willing to recognize a legitimate
state interest justifying the laws. A national med-mal insurance crisis
existed in the 1970s, which continued into the 1980s and 1990s. 44 7 But
courts must examine compulsory court-annexed med-mal arbitration laws
in the context of a state's medical industry at the time a law is challenged.
For example, in Boucher, the Rhode Island Supreme Court struck down
Rhode Island's compulsory med-mal arbitration law because it saw no
evidence that a pressing insurance crisis existed in Rhode Island at the time
the law was challenged. 44 8 Of course, judges must not let personal ideology
overrule sound constitutional interpretation 449 and whether or not a court
thinks tort reform is needed in the first place should not factor into a
450
judicial decision. Perhaps the Simon court succumbed to this temptation.
Nevertheless, one of the judiciary's roles in the U.S. political system is to
ensure that outdated laws that no longer serve a legitimate state interest are
Stricken.
Recent studies show that the magnitude of medical insurance crises may
have been overblown. 4 51 Furthermore, the connection between med-mal
litigation and the rise in insurance premiums is tenuous, 4 52 while the
deterrent and retributive functions of the med-mal cause of action are well
established. 453
It is likely legislators minimize these factors when
responding to constituents' interests, particularly in cases where the medical
lobby has significant sway. Thus, judges should be mindful that the goal of
reducing the number of med-mal lawsuits, although particularly pressing in
454
the late twentieth century, may not be a legitimate state interest today.
C. States Should Encourage Voluntary ADR in Med-Mal Disputes
The theory that compulsory ADR-i.e., ADR forced on parties
concurrent with or soon after the filing of a lawsuit--can be effective is
446. See supra note 333 and accompanying text.
447. See supra Part I.B.2.
448. See supra note 418 and accompanying text.
449. Often such an allegation is called "Lochnerizing." See Lochner v. New York, 198
U.S. 45 (1905); see also Howard Gillman, De-Lochnerizing Lochner, 85 B.U. L. Rev. 859,
861 (2005) (describing the case as "the symbol of judges usurping legislative authority by
basing decisions on policy preferences rather than law").
450. See supra notes 419-20 and accompanying text.
451. See supra note 434; see also Kreindler, supra note 205 ("Republican Sen. Parley
Hellewell told ADRWorld.com that his decision to support the bill last year was 'wrong,'
and he acknowledged that a primary concern raised during debate over the measure-that
malpractice lawsuits are damaging the state's health care system-is not a real problem.
'Doctors are not leaving the state or quitting their practices' because of malpractice suits as
some had warned, he said.").
452. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
453. See supra notes 163-68 and accompanying text.
454. See supra note 424.
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misplaced.
Filing a complaint, thereby initiating litigation, usually
indicates that after considering all the possible ways to resolve a dispute,
the plaintiff is committed to devoting time and resources to litigating the
dispute. 4 55 In most cases, the time for "facilitative" ADR, the process of
bringing the parties together to talk about their differences, has passed.
Indeed, data from the federal pilot programs initiated pursuant to the Civil
Justice Reform Act suggest that compulsory ADR techniques "are not a
panacea for perceived problems of cost and delay" inherent in the normal
process of litigation. 456 Furthermore, med-mal disputes are highly personal
ADR
thus
complicating
charged
affairs,
and
emotionally
4 57
implementation.
A better approach is to encourage the parties to voluntarily use ADR as
soon as a med-mal dispute becomes apparent. A Harvard Medical Practice
Study showed that "[c]laimants often felt it appropriate to file a medical
malpractice action not just because injury or death occurred, but because the
health care providers did not respond with sufficiently obvious and
meaningful concern." 458 Constitutional objections aside, compulsory medmal arbitration simply comes too late in the process to be effective.
Fortunately, hospitals and physicians are including ADR in their conflict
management strategies with greater frequency, and the results have been
4 59
positive.
CONCLUSION

Although ADR has a beneficial role to play in med-mal disputes,
compulsory arbitration is not the answer. Compulsory court-annexed medmal arbitration laws can be challenged on constitutional grounds, but such
460
challenges have tended to be rejected in both federal and state courts.
Nevertheless, some courts have been receptive to arguments that
compulsory court-annexed med-mal arbitration violates constitutional rights
to jury trial, due process, and equal protection. 46 1 Courts considering
similar challenges should recognize that compulsory med-mal arbitration
laws pose unreasonable risks of depriving litigants of a meaningful day in
court and the right to have an unbiased jury trial. Furthermore, courts
should examine states' justifications for passing such laws in the context of
today's society.
Compulsory ADR to resolve medical disputes is
misplaced.

455. See Katz, supra note 5, at 6 ("[C]ompulsory ADR usually takes place after a lawsuit
is filed. The parties believe that they have exhausted all possibility of bilateral discussion.").
456. James S. Kakalik et al., Just, Speedy, and Inexpensive? An Evaluation of Judicial
Case Management Under the Civil Justice Reform Act 20 (1996).
457. See Dauer & Becker, supra note 20, at 1:11-17 (discussing the nature of conflicts
and strains in med-mal disputes).
458. Id. at 1:14.
459. See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
460. See supra Part II.A.
461. See supra Part II.B.
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